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Preface 
This document constitutes a report drawn up in order to support and supplement oral 
evidence presented by Nicky Priaulx and John Horan at the Parliamentary inquiry on 
Abortion and Disability held in March 2013. The Report was submitted in advance of 
the Inquiry to present the Commission of Inquiry with an opportunity to engage with a 
broader range of literature and opinions than the timing for Oral Evidence could 
permit.  
The Inquiry was set up to collect evidence from “parents, medical practitioners, 
academia, support groups, disability groups, lawyers and individuals with an interest 
regarding the current theory, practice and implications of the approach to abortion on 
the grounds of disability in the UK”.  The Terms of Reference for the Inquiry were 
detailed as seeking to:  
 Establish and assess the intention behind the law governing abortion on the 
grounds of disability. 
 Establish how the law works in practice and is interpreted by medical 
practitioners. 
 Determine the impact of the current law on disabled people and assess the 
views of groups representing their interests. 
 Assess the effectiveness of the information and guidance provided to families 
following the diagnosis of a disability and the impact that has on outcomes. 
 Examine how the law, guidance and support for practitioners and families can 
be developed going forward. 
The Inquiry, Chaired by Fiona Bruce MP, was held across four sessions and 
transcripts are available for the first three. Transcripts for the fourth and final session 
in which John Horan and Nicky Priaulx gave Oral Evidence have not as yet been 
included, although the full report detailing the recommendations of the All Party 
Parliamentary Groups concerned has been released. Further details as to the 
Inquiry, including the peers and MPs who led this Inquiry, can be found at: 
http://www.abortionanddisability.org/.  
 
17 August 2013   
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INTRODUCTION 
Our evidence is set out in four broad sections, each of which seeks to centralise 
what we see as being key issues of law, and then to draw in broader literature and 
ideas which come from a broad range of fields, including medical ethics and law, 
sociology, disability rights, feminism and clinical practice. Though we do hold views 
in respect of the existing legal provision, our aim is to illustrate a broad map of issues 
which interconnect and relate to the questions being asked by the Inquiry, as well as 
providing sources from a diverse range of fields which could prove useful for further 
analysis. The sections as laid out refer to the following issues:-  
 
1. PART I: Is paragraph (d) of the 1967 Act discriminatory? Ascertainable 
from the literature there are two alternative invocations of concept of 
“discrimination” in this context: legal and social. Discrimination in a general 
social sense can refer to drawing distinctions between things in ways that are 
seen as morally or practically justified or not (or indeed it can refer to 
distinctions which are totally innocuous and have little social or moral import). 
In the absence of a case of discrimination in strict legal terms, some can 
legitimately form the view that the kinds of distinctions being drawn should 
become the subject-matter of law as illustrated by the development of various 
pieces of equality legislation in respect of gender, sexuality and disability. 
These two ideas of social and legal discrimination very clearly arise in the 
literature. In the first section of the note we explore the question of 
discrimination in a strict de jure sense as it applies to the 1967 Act, and then 
look at the more complex question as to whether paragraph (d) of the 1967 
Act has discriminatory aspects to it. The extent to which paragraph (d) and 
reproductive practices may be symptoms of a broader discriminatory structure 
needs careful analysis. We note a number of things relating to this. We place 
heavy emphasis upon the link between the problematic distinction raised 
between normality and abnormality and the pervasiveness of that distinction 
within a disabling environment; here we highlight concerns around the lack of 
support for and acceptance within society of existing people with disabilities 
and those charged with caring for individuals with disabilities from the 
beginning of life to its end stages. We provide a discussion which draws in 
some of the leading commentators in respect of the provision now under 
analysis by the Inquiry, as well as broader literature from fields of disability 
studies, also including reference to the kinds of recommendations that 
theorists, scholars and activists have made. We seek to critically appraise 
these in Part I, but we also return to these themes later on in this note.  
 
2. PART II: Discrimination, women and disability: While the Inquiry is shaped 
by concern with whether this specific aspect of the Abortion Act 1967 
discriminates against people with disabilities, it is also critical to note that the 
rights of women are clearly central to this question. The provision of safe and 
legal access to contraception and abortion services has been a key part of the 
women’s rights movement and regarded as critical for women’s equality in 
society.  Insofar as it remains the case that the role of child-rearing continues 
to fall predominantly upon women, a socio-economic analysis of the impact of 
caring for any child, including those with disabilities, is demanded. As such, a 
concern with equality and the elimination of discriminatory practices raises a 
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broad range of highly complex and seemingly competing issues. It is not 
evident that revisions to the existing abortion regime will constitute anything 
more than a rhetorical victory for disability equality in the context of a disabling 
society; furthermore, while the distinctions drawn within the Abortion Act may 
well seem suspect and smack of social discrimination, restricting women’s 
ability to terminate (though accepting the possibility some women may 
terminate for such reasons) is tantamount to forcing women to raise an 
unwanted disabled child and to experience corresponding limitations in her 
own life, and the life of her child. We do not, however, think that that is a 
satisfactory state for our society but it is a reality for the women in question. 
As such, we prefer to place a stronger emphasis upon creating an enabling 
society, to exploring how individuals’ choices are shaped, and to making the 
choice for women as to whether to continue a pregnancy or not, far more real 
and informed than it would seem to be.  
 
3. PART III: Paragraph (d) in its broader medico-legal context: As we note 
later in this section, and as will become apparent throughout this note, the 
question of discrimination in the context of section 1(1)(d) of the Abortion Act 
1967 raises a broad range of concerns which extend beyond the provision of 
abortion. The distinction drawn between disability and normality is highly 
pervasive and underpins much of reproductive practice as a whole, from 
genetic counselling, prenatal scanning and screening, to a range of practices 
relating to the provision of in vitro fertilisation (e.g. pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis). There has been a heavy drive towards making the provision of 
antenatal screening for conditions such as Down syndrome. These 
practices/distinctions are also legally reinforced in other ways, for example, 
through wrongful birth negligence suits where a claim is brought for 
compensation based upon the wrongful birth of a disabled child owing to 
alleged negligence in the provision of counselling and treatment provision 
designed to detect foetal anomaly; the claim is explicitly underpinned by 
reference to the deprivation of the opportunity to terminate that pregnancy 
under paragraph (d).1 In this respect we draw attention to existing regulatory 
aspects which relate to medical practice, from those directly pertaining to 
paragraph (d) of the 1967 Act, to questions around informed consent to 
litigation.  
 
4. PART IV: Human Rights and International Perspectives: Here we engage 
with some aspects of law in a European context in order to assess whether it 
could be said that there is a “European perspective” on abortion law, and if so, 
what guidance and jurisprudence is available in the context of being a 
Signatory Member to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
and a Member State of the European Union (EU). We also highlight a range 
of different legal approaches in respect of various European states as this 
relates to foetal abnormality to assess key similarities/differences. The object 
of this latter section is to provide a non-exhaustive, but indicative insight into 
legal regimes which will need to address the very same concerns that form 
the basis of paragraph (d) of the Abortion Act 1967.  
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PART I: DISCRIMINATION 
Formal Discrimination (de jure – in law) 
5. The provision of abortion on the grounds of foetal abnormality clearly 
distinguishes between presumed normal foetuses and presumed disabled 
foetuses. Critical to the question of whether this distinction can be said to be 
discriminatory in a de jure sense (i.e. captured by existing discrimination 
legislation) in respect of the foetus is the issue of legal personhood. This is 
thought to be a matter of well-settled law, since English law affords the 
embryo and foetus no legal personality or independent rights until birth (Paton 
v BPAS [1979] QB 276. In addition, attempts to claim that a foetus has a right 
to life under Article 2 of the ECHR have failed; in Vo v France (2005) 40 
E.H.R.R. 259, the European Court of Human Rights declined to recognise a 
foetus as a person under the Convention, stating that this question was one 
for individual signatory states.2 The claim that the Abortion Act 1967 
discriminates against disabled persons has been met specifically by reference 
to the standing of the foetus in English law; “if one accepts that a foetus does 
not have legal personality, rules that prohibit discrimination cannot apply in 
utero’ (Jackson, Regulating Reproduction, 2001, p. 481). A similar point is 
made by Ann Furedi who notes that, “the idea that abortion for abnormality 
represents discrimination against the disabled… elides the difference between 
foetal life and our respect for persons” (Furedi, 1991, p. 17).  
 
6. Nevertheless, insofar as this is dispositive of the matter of formal 
discrimination as the law is presently structured, the Inquiry will receive written 
evidence which nevertheless compels an analysis as to what justifies this 
practice. It is in this sense that the foetus is not the specific concern, but 
rather that practices to eliminate foetal life with disability can be linked to 
discriminatory attitudes against existing persons with disabilities in a more 
general sense. As such, the question of formal discrimination is arguably 
irrelevant. While it cannot be said that the law (or indeed the practices 
permitted by it) discriminates against (disabled) foetuses, it is nevertheless 
arguable that it does serve to draw pernicious distinctions about disabled 
individuals given that the policy of the law is shaped by ex-utero 
considerations. Often such arguments are attended by the language of 
‘discrimination’, in the sense that disability rights proponents are drawing 
attention to practices which treat persons with disabilities as second-class 
citizens. Moreover, for some authors, the distinctive treatment of disabled 
foetuses which underpins termination of pregnancy under paragraph (d) and 
broader reproductive practices seem resonant of eugenic practices of the 
past. We specifically return to the issue of eugenics later.  
 
Disability Rights and Social Discrimination 
7. Here we raise a series of considerations around the question of whether, in a 
social sense, the foetal abnormality clause can be seen as discriminatory (or 
indeed, ‘eugenic’). This does not point to one single perspective or 
conclusion, but is raised to illustrate some different issues and views which 
congregate around paragraph (d) of the 1967 Act. Our aim is to flesh out in 
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more detail a complex of views around the idea that the policy of the law as 
discerned from paragraph (d) is based upon discriminatory attitudes towards 
disabled people.  
 
8. The disability rights movement has fought (and continues to fight) hard to 
promote disability equality and the inclusion of disabled people in society. An 
important aspect of that fight has been to illustrate that disability to a very 
significant extent is created by society, rather than through impairment. 
Slogans such as “disabled by society, not by our bodies” encapsulate 
powerfully how attitudes and indeed, architecture – social choices – can 
disable (so a decision to build stairs, rather than a lift, for example, can 
disable an individual with mobility issues; as such, it draws attention to the 
kinds of social choices that can make an impairment, disabling). This theory, 
and political conception, is often referred to as the “Social Model of Disability”, 
which is often raised in opposition to a quite different paradigm – the “Medical 
Model of Disability”, which posits impairment as inherently 
disabling/tragic/something to be cured or eliminated, and ignores the 
importance of the social environment in constructing disability.  
 
9. There is no doubt that, based on a preliminary view of the social model of 
disability, that paragraph (d) of the Abortion Act 1967 looks immediately 
problematic and pernicious. The assumption that termination of potentially 
disabled life is something desirable and acceptable as forming the basis of 
general legal policy seems to smack of the medical model of disability. We 
return to think about how abortion policy plays out specifically, but at this 
level, there is no doubt that this particular aspect of abortion policy needs 
justification. In terms of how these ideas feed directly to abortion policy, 
various commentators including disability rights activists have focused on the 
question of whether it can be said to be discriminatory in this social sense. We 
attempt to capture some of this commentary, also having reference to some 
leading bioethical, legal and disability rights commentary.  
 
10. The UK Disability Rights Commission (DRC), which was set up in 2000 
(replaced in 2007 by the Equality and Human Rights Commission) with the 
remit of advising how to combat discrimination against the disabled singled 
out paragraph (d) for concern. The DRC stated of section 1(1)(d) that it is: 
“offensive to many people; it reinforces negative stereotypes of disability and 
there is substantial support for the view that to permit terminations at any 
point during a pregnancy on the ground of risk of disability, while time limits 
apply to other grounds set out in the Abortion Act, is incompatible with valuing 
disability and non-disability equality.” In the same statement, the DRC stated 
that “in common with a wide range of disability and other organisations” it 
believed “the context in which parents choose whether to have a child should 
be one in which disability and non-disability are valued equally” (Disability 
Rights Commission, 2004). Critically, the DRC did not make any proposal to 
repeal any part of the 1967 Act, but was concerned with the information and 
advice women received from the medical profession.  
 
11. Some of the literature engages the concept of ‘eugenics’ in reference to 
abortion policy as it relates to this hard distinction between ‘normality’ and 
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‘disability’. The concept of what is ‘eugenic’ and how a eugenic system 
operates creates sharp disagreement between different authors. Sally 
Sheldon remarks in her analysis of Parliamentary debates leading up to the 
enactment of the 1967 Act that the original ‘foetal abnormality’ clause 
(s.1(1)(b)) prior to the amendment by section 37 of the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 1990 (which removed the time-limit in respect of foetal 
abnormality) clearly displayed eugenicist considerations, however, it can also 
be interpreted with regard to the welfare of the woman: “in part on the grounds 
that to force a woman to carry an abnormal child to term will discourage her 
from future pregnancy” (Sheldon S. , 1997). However, over two decades have 
passed since that revision. Ann Furedi also notes that while 1967 Act in its 
original form may have been “initially motivated by eugenic considerations”, 
she comments that “today, it is very definitely the case that abortion is not 
seen by doctors, policy-makers or women themselves as within that tradition 
of social engineering’” (Furedi, 1991, p. 16). Rather the contemporary context 
for abortion is one where “its provision meets the request of a woman who no 
longer wants to be pregnant”. Lee and Morgan by contrast, note how 
paragraph (d) was “most clearly favoured ground for abortion” and suggest 
that Britain has actually embraced a “much more explicitly based eugenic 
abortion policy than before 1990” (cited in Bailey, 1996, p. 160).  
 
12. Amongst these engagements sit very different views as to what ‘eugenics’ 
means; the most thoughtful and perhaps reflective engagement with the 
concept of eugenics is provided by Tom Shakespeare, a leading disability 
rights commentator; he draws a distinction between hard and weak eugenics. 
Strong eugenics he argues can be defined as “population-level improvement 
by control of reproduction via state intervention, such as happened in the 
1930s. It is motivated by the social judgement that disabled people’s lives are 
unworthy of life, and/or that society should not have to bear the financial costs 
of supporting its non-productive members”. By contrast, weak eugenics “could 
be defined as promoting technologies of reproductive selection via non-
coercive individual choices” (Shakespeare, 1998, p. 669). Based on this 
definition, and particularly focusing on prenatal screening, he comments that 
“current British genetic practices are weakly, but not strongly, eugenic. There 
is strong rhetorical commitment to individual choice and to the avoidance of 
suffering” (Shakespeare, 1998, p. 669). As Shakespeare’s broader 
engagement with questions around prenatal screening and abortion on the 
grounds of disability illustrate, it is not necessarily helpful to describe these 
practices as straightforwardly eugenic, although clinical practice and the 
‘context in which reproductive decisions are made, undermines the capacity 
for free choice and promotes eugenic outcomes’ (Shakespeare, 1998, p. 666). 
We return to Shakespeare’s analysis of abortion on the grounds of foetal 
abnormality and the practices which surround it shortly, as well as examine 
his recommendations for potential reform.  
 
13. But a preliminary observation at this point is to note that it may not be helpful 
to refer to paragraph (d) as (strongly or weakly) eugenic, insofar as it may be 
better seen as an expression or symptom of highly pervasive norms in society 
which continues to be structured by reference to ideas which draw strong 
distinctions between health and abnormality; insofar as some of these can be 
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assessed as deeply problematic, others cannot. There are also practical and 
understandable reasons for drawing such distinctions which we do all the time 
– concerns with road safety, health and safety in the workplace, alcohol and 
drug consumption, obesity, the spread of HIV/STIs and a range of range of 
diseases and conditions which we actively try to avoid – are all directed 
towards combating social factors which can abbreviate life or make it harder. 
Insofar as these are all based upon a distinction drawn between normality and 
abnormality, the normative aspiration is not based upon a pernicious 
distinction, but rather one that is directed at making our lives as full and 
healthy as they can be. An assumption that to draw a distinction between 
health and abnormality is necessarily eugenic would result in a quite perverse 
claim that most public policy interventions were harmful and should cease.  
 
Sheldon and Wilkinson’s Analysis of Paragraph (d) 
14. Sally Sheldon (academic lawyer) and Steve Wilkinson’s (bioethicist) (2001) 
analysis of paragraph (d) of the 1967 Act is one of the most sophisticated in 
considering the ethical justifications (and whether they succeed) for that 
provision. Their work provides a leading reference point in the literature. They 
do not rule out the possibility that at least in terms of some aspects of its 
operation, that it may appear discriminatory but this follows a careful and well 
considered critique. They highlight a number of possibilities as to how that 
provision has been typically regarded as justified, the most convincing of 
which are the ‘foetal interests’ argument and the ‘parental interests’ argument.  
 
15. The ‘foetal interests’ argument: abortion for foetal abnormality would be 
justified if it were possible to say that if born, the child would quite literally be 
better off dead. As Sheldon and Wilkinson note, such a reading would be 
wholly out of line with abortion practice, given that the vast majority of 
abortions are performed for conditions such as Down syndrome, where a 
person need not suffer at all. As such, as a justification for paragraph (d), the 
‘foetal interest’ argument fails.  
 
16. The most convincing justification for paragraph (d), Sheldon and Wilkinson 
argue, is the ‘parental interest’ argument. This idea is based on the effects on 
the mother resulting from the birth of a disabled child. As academic lawyer 
Gillian Douglas notes, considerations of impact on the parents ‘seem[ed] to 
have qualified the compelling nature of the arguments that a handicapped 
child’s right to life is as valid as that of any other’ (Douglas, 1991, p. 93). The 
effect in question is commonly related to the emotional, financial and caring 
burden which results from the birth of a disabled child and is well elucidated 
by Barnes et al,  
 
“The justification offered is that a disabled child places an excessive 
burden on the woman/family/society – both in terms of additional 
time needed to support the child as well as the financial and 
emotional resources that must be devoted to its well-being – with a 
consequent deterioration in the quality of family life and 
relationships” (Barnes, Mercer, & Shakespeare, 2003, p. 222). 
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Sheldon and Wilkinson note, quite critically, that there are “serious problems 
with the Parental Interests Argument, even if one accepts for the sake of 
argument (as we do here) its empirical premise that caring for a child with a 
disability is typically more difficult and costly than caring for a child without a 
disability” (Sheldon & Wilkinson, 2001). In this respect they identify a number 
of issues:  
 
17. Paragraph (d) is not simply about Parental Interests: Here Sheldon and 
Wilkinson look at the issue of the intentions of Parliament. If paragraph (d) 
relates to Parental Interests then it is superfluous and unnecessarily repeats 
the provision contained in paragraph (a) of the 1967 Act which permits 
termination when continuing with the pregnancy would be likely to threaten 
the woman’s mental or physical health. This combined with section 1(2) (the 
social ground) which permits practitioners to take account of the woman’s 
“actual or reasonably foreseeable environment” has been interpreted as 
permitting terminations where there is evidence that continuing a pregnancy 
would place the woman under unnecessary strain. When interpreting 
Parliament’s intention, it surely must not have sought to reiterate paragraph 
(a); and indeed the removal of the time limit in respect of paragraph (d) also 
adds to this view.  
 
18. The Disability Rights Objection: The second objection to paragraph (d) is what 
Sheldon and Wilkinson refer to as the Disability Rights Objection (DDO) which 
has been levelled by individuals from the disability rights movement. The 
thrust of the DDO claim is that paragraph (d) fails to take into account that 
many of the problems confronted by parents of children with disabilities are 
the result of discrimination rather than impairment per se. A parallel, Sheldon 
and Wilkinson note, often made by disability rights commentators is to that of 
gender and ethnicity where it would seem outrageous to suggest that 
abortions could be permitted on grounds of race or gender by reference to the 
additional strain that parents would be subject to. Sheldon and Wilkinson 
note, that if disability were on a par with gender and ethnicity that the 
‘Parental Interest’ Argument would also fail (because the DDO would be 
completely made out). As Sheldon and Wilkinson note, if the social model of 
disability holds, in the sense that it can be said that it is only society that 
‘disables’, then abortion on the grounds of disability would appear to amount 
to “colluding with (and perhaps also encouraging) discrimination against 
people with disabilities”.  
 
Impairment per se can be disabling  
19. Sheldon and Wilkinson argue that the social model of disability ‘ignores the 
obvious fact that some of the disadvantages associated with disability are not 
caused by society, but are intrinsic parts of the impairment itself”. Here they 
note that:  
 
“Disabilities can involve pain, or reduced life-span, or important 
inabilities of various kinds: such as the loss of a sense modality or 
reduced mobility. Where present, these things are intrinsic ‘evils’: 
harms which are not caused by society and which, arguably, no 
10 
 
amount of social intervention, short of removing the impairment, can 
take away. So while, clearly, many people with disabilities are the 
victims of harmful (and wrongful) social discrimination and exclusion, 
these social factors are not the whole story.” 
 
20. As such, Sheldon and Wilkinson argue that disability is not, in this sense, like 
gender or ethnicity. Disability also involves impairment, whilst gender and 
ethnicity do not. While it is plausible to think that while virtually all of the 
problems experienced by women are the product of social discrimination, in 
the context of disability, some of these are caused by the impairment itself. 
On this basis the parallel drawn between disability and gender, is (at least 
partially) flawed. As such, the authors note that the ‘disadvantages associated 
with disability (unlike, say, those associated with being female) are not entirely 
a matter of social discrimination, but are at least partly caused directly by 
impairment.’  
 
21. The problems that Sheldon and Wilkinson highlight with the Social Model of 
Disability, in the sense that too much emphasis is placed upon society as 
disabling without much attention to the impact of impairment, are also 
highlighted by others. Tom Shakespeare (Shakespeare, 2006) for example, 
notes that the social model began as the definitions “which underpinned a set 
of practical political positions”. It was intended to be a political intervention, 
not a social theory. Noting that the social model has been an important means 
to the goals of the disability movement in promoting disability equality and the 
inclusion of disabled people in society, he notes that the social model now 
needs rethinking where it has become outdated. Shakespeare’s analysis is 
sophisticated and extends beyond what can be encapsulated here (though is 
germane to any policy-directed enquiry as to how to promote equality) but it 
does point to the difficulty in disentangling the complex relationship between 
impairment and disability, and the social from the biological.  
 
22. In particular, however, he notes how the Social Model has defined disability in 
terms of oppression and barriers, and breaks the link between disability and 
impairment. This has led to the “common criticism that social model 
approaches have neglected the role of impairment” (Shakespeare, 2006, p. 
36). Here the thrust of such criticisms is not that impairment is an explanation 
for disadvantage, but impairment is nevertheless an important aspect of 
disabled people’s lives; for some the personal experience of pain and 
limitation can often be a part of impairment. As Shakespeare notes, ‘there is a 
danger of ignoring the problematic reality of biological limitation’. While 
impairment affects people in different ways, and can also bring opportunities, 
some are,  
 
‘comparatively unaffected by impairment, or else the main 
consequences of impairment arise from other people’s attitudes. For 
others, impairment limits the experiences and opportunities they can 
experience. In some cases, impairment causes progressive 
degeneration and premature death. These features of impairment 
cause distress to many disabled people, and any adequate account 
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of disability has to give space to the difficulties which many 
impairments cause’ (Shakespeare, 2006, pp. 42-3).  
 
Shakespeare notes that everyone, even the supposedly able-bodied 
experience limitations; but for many ‘impairment is not neutral, because it 
involves intrinsic disadvantage. Disabling barriers make impairment more 
difficult, but even in the absence of barriers impairment can be problematic’ 
(Shakespeare, 2006, p. 43). This analysis, which has only been very broadly 
summarised here, leads Shakespeare to comment: 
 
“The social model of disability makes a distinction between 
impairment and disability; claims that disability can be removed by 
social change; and downplays the role of impairment in the lives of 
disabled people. … My claim is that, even in the most accessible 
world there will always be residual disadvantage attached to many 
impairments. If people have fatigue, there is a limited amount that 
can be done to help: motorised scooters and other aids may help 
increase range and scope of activities, but ultimately the individual 
will be disadvantaged when compared to others. An accessible 
environment minimises the inconvenience of impairment but does 
not equalise disabled people with non-disabled people” 
(Shakespeare, Disability Rights and Wrongs, 2006, p. 50). 
 
Paragraph (d): Social Discrimination   
 
23. Shakespeare’s work, which is worth reading in full, neatly intersects with the 
concerns raised by Sheldon and Wilkinson. In considering the complex 
relationship between impairment and disability as social discrimination, and its 
application to paragraph (d) of the Abortion Act 1967, Sheldon and Wilkinson 
note that in certainly one key respect, the Disability Discrimination Objection 
partially succeeds:  
 
“For one of the reasons why selectively terminating disabled 
foetuses is judged to be in parents’ interests is social discrimination, 
one aspect of which is a lack of support services for the parents of 
disabled children or prejudice against those children”.  
 
Here they raise the concern as to problems relating to the provision of welfare 
services, financial benefits to parents of disabled children, in order to make it 
easier for parents to choose to decide to continue with such a pregnancy. As 
they note in this respect,  
 
“If parents would feel able to care for a disabled child with greater 
social assistance and in the absence of prejudice and discrimination, 
then legally to endorse termination because prejudice exists and 
assistance will not be forthcoming is worrying. Whilst any society will 
have to make a choice about where resources are to be allocated, in 
this instance the availability of abortion may conceal the pressure 
placed on potential parents by the lack of availability of financial and 
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other support. A more honest and open evaluation of the rationale 
for s.1(1)(d), should at least contribute to public debate of this issue” 
(Sheldon & Wilkinson, 2001). 
 
24. Sheelagh McGuinness, an academic lawyer and bioethicist, notes in similar 
force to Shakespeare, Sheldon and Wilkinson that ‘In the context of 
reproductive choice, there are good reasons to be concerned about potential 
disease, illness or disability in future children and further good reasons to take 
steps to ameliorate these where possible. If this were not the case, then why 
endorse policies of pregnant women taking folic acid or avoiding smoking?’ 
However, she also notes that ‘the problem with the current operation of 
s.1(1)(d) is that it fails to distinguish between cases where we have reason to 
be concerned and cases where we do not.’ Rather, in McGuinness’s view, it is 
time that the law relating to reproductive choice reflects a more nuanced and 
subtle understanding of ‘disability’ than the Abortion Act 1967 currently 
encapsulates (McGuinness, 2013, p. 29).  
 
Seeking a more ‘nuanced’ understanding of disability in the 1967 Act 
 
25. Authors such as McGuiness, Sheldon and Wilkinson, Shakespeare (and 
others not encapsulated here) illustrate the presence of the view that even if it 
cannot be said that the entire operation of s.1(1)(d) relates to issues of social 
discrimination given that impairment can also be inherently disabling, certainly 
one aspect of its operation can be said to coincide with discrimination. From a 
practical perspective this raises serious issues which are somewhat messy to 
untangle;  
 
a. first about the extent to which one can separate out and draw up 
medical criteria which distinguishes from impairments which are 
inherently disabling from those which are the product of social 
discrimination;  
b. second, even if that might be thought possible, there is also the 
question of whether we should. This latter issue raises issues of whose 
interests are at stake here, as well as the implications for prospective 
parents who will nevertheless in the absence of serious work on the 
part of society and the government in creating an enabling 
environment, be confronted directly with the hard reality of an absence 
of such resources/support. This raises a serious question about the 
extent to which those individuals themselves will become the victims of 
social discrimination.  
 
Distinguishing Inherently Disabling Conditions from the Disabling Impact of 
Social Discrimination 
 
26. In terms of a practical operation of this in terms of abortion law, drawing such 
distinctions presents a problem. As Sheldon and Wilkinson note, the solution 
would seem to point to a law that permits abortion which is only directed 
towards the harms caused directly by impairment. Nevertheless they note that 
this might mean “making rather finer-grained distinctions between, on the one 
hand, disabilities which involve relatively minor impairments and where most 
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of the ‘evils’ are social and, on the other, disabilities which have more 
substantial impairment elements and would be seriously harmful even in the 
absence of social discrimination” (Sheldon & Wilkinson, 2001). And indeed, as 
Shakespeare’s extended and sophisticated analysis on the complex 
interrelationship between society and impairment illustrates, ‘it is hard to 
separate impairment from disability in the everyday lives of disabled people’ 
(Shakespeare, Disability Rights and Wrongs, 2006, p. 36).  
 
27. As such, an analysis of this broader literature as to the extent that existing 
abortion policy as based upon paragraph (d) colludes with social 
discrimination, presents a complex picture. Some terminations will be directed 
towards impairment, the most obvious example being where the foetal 
abnormality is lethal or where the outcome for the foetus following birth is so 
bleak, as cases of Tay Sachs, where even with the best care, most children 
will have died of this condition by the age of four. Though little discussion 
attends McGuinnesses’ proposal for a more nuanced definition of disability 
under paragraph (d), she seems to intimate that we should reject the 
language of ‘handicap’ in favour of focusing instead on ‘concepts like suffering 
as we have in other areas’ (McGuinness, 2013, p. 30). Here McGuinness 
would seem to have in mind those cases involving severely disabled neonates 
and the operation of the kinds of medico-legal guidelines that apply in cases 
involving the proposed withdrawal of life sustaining treatment to severely 
disabled neonates. This would, it seems, serve to reduce the scope of 
permissible terminations to those which are adjudged as fitting the ‘Foetal 
Interests’ Argument – where it can be said that it would be better (or indeed, 
in the ‘best interest’ of the foetus) to not exist. Nevertheless, an analysis of the 
variety of approaches used in addressing even that question in the context of 
a live neonate, illustrate the problems of defining and determining when life is 
no longer worth supporting (Morris A. , 2009).  
 
28. There are three particular objections to reducing paragraph (d) to a restrictive 
definition of ‘suffering’. The first relates to the extent that this can be identified 
in utero and the reliability of medical science and available technologies to 
objectively identify conditions which ‘fit’ the Foetal Interests Argument and 
ideas of “intolerable suffering”, “no chance”, “no purpose” or “unbearable” if 
any such concepts were to be applied. What conditions are productive of 
suffering depends on the particular prognoses in question, and these can 
often be highly complex and probabilistic. It may, however, be easier 
determining which conditions do not involve inherent suffering (e.g. conditions 
which are remediable), though it is also to be expected that this information 
will be readily put to prospective parents.  We return to this issue in Part III 
where we look at these concerns as they operate in medical practice.  
 
29. The second issue relates to the question of whether ‘suffering’ should be 
assessed purely on the basis of medical determinations. Even if it were 
reasonable to suppose that ‘suffering’ could form the basis for a revised 
understanding paragraph (d), it would be hard, if not superficial, to restrict it to 
foetal health alone. In terms of the current interpretation of the Abortion Act 
1967, paragraph (d) can be rationalised as speaking to parental interests. In 
the case of Jepson, the applicant in an action for judicial review sought judicial 
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clarification of particular aspects of paragraph (d), and claimed that the 
practice of clinicians consulting with and taking into account the views of 
parents was unlawful. Though this issue was never judicially considered, it is 
noteworthy that while the 1967 Act is silent on the matter, and affords no 
specific ‘right’ to decide other than to doctors who must determine in good 
faith whether a woman meets relevant grounds of the 1967 Act. Yet case law 
has consistently placed women at the heart of such decision-making,3 in a 
way that aligns with and supports contemporary consultative medical practice 
(Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 2010). Once one takes 
women and the familial environment into account, the reproductive interests of 
individuals, their ability to manage, as well as broader equality concerns 
relating to women who typically continue to be the main caretakers of 
children, the question of whose interests are at stake in respect of paragraph 
(d) of the 1967 Act, and the issue of when and how ‘suffering’ is assessed is 
tough. Even if one were to seek to stipulate that suffering should become the 
central tenet for that provision, it is difficult to restrict that to a medical 
prospect of foetal suffering in the abstract. Rather the interests and welfare of 
potential children are inextricably intertwined with the interests and welfare of 
prospective parents; suffering in respect of a condition cannot be assessed in 
a vacuum. Even in a more enabling society which provides more in the way of 
support for caretakers of seriously disabled children, it is realistic to think that 
the kinds of adaptations required for and needs of providing a meaningful life 
for a seriously disabled child including hands-on care may impact upon a 
woman’s life and employment prospects in a way that also raises serious 
equality concerns. Reducing a woman’s ability to terminate a pregnancy in 
respect of this is tantamount to compelling her to continue a pregnancy and 
raise a child with potentially a very significant impact upon her life as well as 
the life of the child. We return to this issue in Part II under the heading of 
women, reproduction and equality.  
 
30. The third issue relates to the point above, but is firmly situated in the society 
in which we live; disentangling the relationship between social discrimination 
and impairment is far harder to do. There may be the presence of particular 
conditions which in themselves have a very significant disabling effect but not 
entail intolerable suffering, yet when combined with a society that is not 
enabling, that this leads to suffering. This does uncomfortably raise the issue 
of social discrimination and/or the fact that society needs to place a great deal 
of investment and time into creating an enabling environment which meets the 
multifarious and sometimes very complex needs of parents and their children, 
but it is nevertheless the society in which we, and indeed prospective parents 
of disabled children do live.  
 
31. To a large degree, we confront a dilemma here; few can deny that 
“considerable personal and financial sacrifice may be involved in raising a 
child with disability and this will be exacerbated by lack of appropriate 
support.” (McGuinness, 2013, p. 29). How we might respond to this really 
depends on the extent to how we identify the problem. McGuinness notes, 
that social discrimination exists and makes raising children with disabilities 
harder “does not justify or make section 1(1)(d) any more acceptable”; in her 
view, we should reject this ground, but critically alongside this, that “work 
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should be done on changing social institutions so that there is better support 
in place” (McGuinness, 2013, p. 29).  For the present writers, given that 
Disability Discrimination legislation has now been in existence for nearly two 
decades, the idea that rejecting this ground and suggesting that ‘work should 
be done’ is a rather academic and problematic conclusion. As we suggest 
later here, we do not accept that the 1967 Act should be reformed at this point 
in time, but that there is absolutely no doubt that an enormous governmental 
and social effort needs to be made in changing social institutions so that there 
is better support in place. Not only will this help prospective parents to feel 
that they have the resources and support to continue with any pregnancy, but 
from a population wide perspective, working upon creating an enabling 
environment is vastly in the interests of us all. Most of us are likely, whether 
through road accidents, or illness or simply old age, to suffer restrictions in 
mobility and function, and as such, most of us should be able to identify that 
creating an enabling environment will enhance all of our lives. To reject 
aspects of paragraph (d) of the Abortion Act 1967, is actually a lazy option 
and a non-solution to a problem which is far more pervasive and problematic 
insofar as it cuts through every aspect of our daily lives.  
 
Scholars’ Recommendations in respect of Paragraph (d) 
 
32. A variety of positions can be found in respect of how, if at all, the Abortion Act 
1967 might be revised in line with a finding that aspects of the operation of 
paragraph (d) might be said to send out – as many have suggested – 
negative signals about the lives and value of existing individuals with 
disability. Commentators in the field admit of three slightly different positions:  
 
a. restricting terminations for disability to a specification of very serious 
conditions as assessed clinically;  
b. the creation of a common time limit irrespective of health or 
abnormality; 
c. leaving the 1967 Act undisturbed.  
 
In respect of (b), few are prepared to pin down where precisely that common 
time limit should sit, but in our view it cannot be considered in the absence of 
(a) unless one is prepared to compel women to continue pregnancies to term 
irrespective of the fact that they may be carrying a foetus with a lethal 
abnormality or grave defect. We would note the utility of exploring the kinds of 
conditions for which termination is typically performed under paragraph (d) 
after 24 weeks, and the numbers of abortions involved (see further 
paragraphs [34 – 39] of this document).  
 
 
Stipulating what amounts to serious disability 
 
33. As we saw above, Sheelagh McGuinness recommended the possibility of 
centralising ‘suffering’ as the central criterion in assessing when termination of 
pregnancy for foetal abnormality might be permissible. We noted some of the 
difficulties of the view that one should only focus on foetal health, when in our 
view the question of suffering and welfare can be seen as part of a familial 
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equation and in a social environment. Such questions cannot be addressed in 
the abstract. Nevertheless, even on clinical grounds alone there are concerns. 
McGuinness’ approach seems to take inspiration from other clinical contexts, 
in particular the determination of when clinicians would be justified in 
withdrawing life sustaining treatment from severely disabled neonates. 
However, an application of this criterion to in utero situations would present, 
other than in the very clearest cases such as ancephaly or the presence of 
other certain fatal defects, a serious definitional and practical problem for 
medical professionals using diagnostic tools which can rarely provide 
certainties. Those diagnostic issues are also amplified when one considers 
obvious definitional problems and the legal environment in which medical 
decision making takes place. The manner by which the Abortion Act 1967 
presents a series of defences to what are otherwise criminal offences also 
needs considering; the slippery nature of ‘suffering’ coupled with the chilling 
effect of the criminal law, alongside doctors sense of responsibility to parents 
and wanting to the right thing by foetal life and parents, will create stark and 
difficult choices for clinicians who believe, probabilistically, that a foetus if born 
may well “suffer” or have “no chance”. In some circumstances, clinicians may 
feel that these are likely outcomes, but not certainties; as such there is an 
opposite danger of clinicians erring on the side of ‘legal safety’ and bringing 
into existence children who will lead short lives and suffer.  We need to be 
guided by medical opinion carefully in adjudging the ramifications of setting 
down criteria which has proved difficult to apply in cases of live neonates as 
well as clarifying the extent to which criteria of this sort already is 
operationalized in the context of prenatal testing and counselling.   
 
34. As was made explicit in the Jepson action, the applicant for judicial review 
wanted an analysis of what constituted a ‘serious handicap’. This approach 
would appear to complement that of McGuinness, as well as the position of 
other authors who have suggested that paragraph (d) should be understood 
as relating to the “seriousness of the condition which the prospective child 
might have” (Scott, 2005, p. 303). Jepson argued that paragraph (d) has to be 
understood by reference to whether the condition was remediable or not. As 
medical professionals have impressed upon us, health care teams take 
serious steps to address with parents, through a care journey including 
referral to relevant practitioners including paediatric consultants, where 
remediability of a condition is a possibility. Insofar as cleft palate can be 
indicative of a range of other, and far more serious chromosomal problems it 
is not sufficient to assume that the clinicians who were the subject of the 
Jepson case, had authorised an abortion simply for cleft palate. Rather an 
initial investigation of the case by the West Mercia police found that medical 
professionals had adjudged the case in good faith, and the Crown 
Prosecution Service on analysis of a broader range of evidence, including 
medical evidence, arrived at the same conclusion. This raises the question as 
to whether there is any evidence supporting that the medical profession is 
really providing terminations of pregnancy for anything less than serious 
disability; our discussions with clinicians suggested that while there used to be 
a practice of terminating for trivial conditions this is far less prevalent and that 
in respect of cleft palate alone (along with twisted ankle/club foot), the view 
was expressed “we wouldn’t terminate for just those”.4 We do not assume that 
17 
 
the clinicians to whom we have spoken present a unified position that is 
typical of obstetric practice, but raise the question in terms of whether it is. A 
broader analysis of the conditions for which terminations under Ground E are 
performed after 24 weeks, however, provides some substance to the idea that 
‘seriousness’ does constitute a medical threshold in practice (see further, 
paragraph [37] of this document in particular). In the face of a widespread and 
routine practice of antenatal screening, with a total of 716,060 maternities 
(Office for National Statistics, 2012), coupled with the complexity of assessing 
the results which emerge (there will be few ‘perfect pregnancies’), the number 
of abortions performed under paragraph (d) (Ground E) would appear to be 
fairly modest at just over 1 per cent of all terminations performed (Department 
of Health, May 2012). A second strand of the Jepson case would seem to 
suggest that what constitutes a ‘serious handicap’ should be defined by law. 
The difficulties we allude to above highlight difficulties in achieving such a 
definitive list, and this approach has also been rejected by the RCOG (Royal 
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 2010). We discuss the definition 
of ‘substantial risk’ and ‘serious handicap’ in Part III in respect of the medico-
legal environment.   
 
Common Time Limit 
 Common Time Limit: At 24 weeks 
35. A fairly significant number of authors argue that while the distinction between 
presumed ‘normal’ and presumed ‘disabled’ foetal life does appear, in some 
respects, to send out negative signals in respect of the equal value of all 
human beings, the simplest and most obvious solution would be to create a 
common time limit in respect of any abortion. This would remove, at least in 
the letter of the law, the problematic dichotomy between normal and 
abnormal, and the differences between gestational points at which a foetus 
can be destroyed. Tom Shakespeare for example argues that “the law should 
not discriminate between impaired and non-impaired foetuses: a common 
time limit should be adopted for all pregnancies” (Shakespeare, 1998, p. 671). 
The more difficult question is where that ‘common time limit’ should sit.  
 
36. The point of viability accepted by medical professionals as standing at 24 
weeks is a useful starting point for analysis. It is difficult to identify anyone 
who has suggested that that common time limit should stand at 24 weeks, the 
point of foetal viability, though there are, very practical and important reasons 
shaping why that point would be impossible and impractical in respect of all 
pregnancies.  
 
37. A critical point to make is that while in 2011, in England and Wales a total of 
2,307 of abortions (constituting just over 1 per cent of all abortions performed, 
196,082) were performed under Ground E/Paragraph (d), a total of 146 
terminations were performed after 24 weeks (Department of Health, May 
2012, para 2.14).  An analysis of the statistics and information made available 
states that 2 of those 146 terminations were performed under Grounds other 
than E, and that of those performed under Ground E, that these reveal that 
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the underlying conditions include Congenital abnormalities relating to the 
nervous system (Anencephaly (3), encephalocele (1), microcephaly (1), 
hydrocephalus (3), other malformations of the brain (24), spina bifida (9), with 
other nervous system abnormalities (13), the cardiovascular system (17), the 
respiratory system (7), the urinary system (7), the musculoskeletal system (7); 
other conditions such as Down’s syndrome (17), Edwards’ syndrome (2), 
Patau’s syndrome (1); with other conditions being referenced by a range of 
factors including exposure to communicable disease, fetal disorders related to 
gestation and growth, and the fetus affected by maternal factors. Quite 
critically, an analysis of the disorders in question suggests that grave 
conditions do lie at the heart of most if not all abortions performed under 
paragraph (d) after 24 weeks. And importantly, no abortions were recorded as 
being performed under any ground, at any time for cleft lip and cleft palate 
(Department of Health, May 2012, p. 23).  
 
38. This analysis (paragraph 37) helps to contextualise what we are talking about 
and what the repercussions of creating a common time limit to 24 weeks 
would entail. On the statistics of 2011, this would impact upon around 1445 
terminations, which do seem to admit of extremely serious conditions. As 
such, valid questions can be asked about the viability of those foetuses, and 
where the conditions in question could be said to admit of such serious 
impairments which are disabling in themselves, the extent to which we can 
say that terminations performed after 24 weeks really serve to collude with 
social discrimination (even if the manner by which law is drawn up, in terms of 
what it appears to permit, sounds discriminatory). An analysis of medical 
practice problematizes the idea that paragraph (d) as it operates as a special 
ground beyond 24 weeks, in practice is either eugenic or discriminatory.  
 
39. The absence of a limit for abortions performed under paragraph (d) can be 
seen as being shaped by the state of technology where society and medical 
practice has well-established means of detecting foetal abnormality. As has 
been impressed upon us through discussions with general practitioners and 
consultant gynaecologists, while initial scans occur at 10-12 weeks, the 
second scan that all women (within Wales) receive typically occur between 
19-20 weeks. As was impressed upon us, around 80 per cent of abnormalities 
can be detected between 16-18 weeks, cardiac abnormalities between 19-22 
weeks alongside a range of other conditions. 2 per cent of women may 
present for a variety of reasons as late as 22 weeks and typically these 
women come from backgrounds which are predisposed to presenting with 
high risk of foetal abnormality. Some scans might suggest the presence of 
Down syndrome in which case amniocentesis is offered. Some cardiac 
problems are detected as late as 30-32 weeks, and later scans can flag up 
problems in respect of foetal growth. In the midst of this, medical 
professionals in the context of a broad team will also need to explain to 
patients what the problem is, how it will affect the foetus and to provide 
information. Patients in turn need time to think over that information, to consult 
with other professionals to whom they are referred in respect of advice 
concerning post-delivery treatment (e.g. cardiac abnormalities) and ultimately 
make an informed decision about what to do. A time limit of 24 weeks across 
the board in respect of the state of the foetus would have the impact of 
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denying many women the opportunity to terminate a pregnancy of a seriously 
disabled foetus or potentially, resulting in a rushed decision based on a 
paucity of information (where more reliable information is available later in 
respect of foetal growth). More accurate information concerning serious 
disability typically can only be made available in some cases after 24 weeks 
following further testing and investigation.  
 
Common Time Limit: Removal of Time Limit in Respect of All 
Terminations  
 
40. An alternative approach is to remove the gestational time limit entirely. This 
approach is favoured by Julian Salvalescu and is implicit in the approach of 
Sheldon and Wilkinson. As Salvalescu argues, by reference to the fact that 
maternal interests are necessarily implicated by the question of abortion and 
paragraph (d) and that the foetus lacks full moral personhood and lacks legal 
personhood entirely, “We should liberalise our approach to [late termination of 
pregnancy] and eschew considerations of foetal abnormality as a ground for 
[late termination of pregnancy]. If we are to give any weight to maternal 
interests, this should be the sole ground for justifying [terminations of 
pregnancy], early or late” (Salvalescu, 2001, p. 169). It may be thought that 
for some, that the removal of the upper time limit for abortion will prove an 
unpalatable choice. For objectors, this will be extending an open invitation for 
terminations to occur at any point during gestation in a ways that is totally 
divorced from issues of foetal viability which many see as clinically and 
morally significant. But it is an approach that merits examination. In practice, 
as a variety of commentators have pointed out (Jackson, Regulating 
Reproduction, 2001; Furedi, 1991) late abortion is not an easy choice for 
women and in practice, most seek terminations as soon as possible; very few 
abortions, beyond cases where foetal abnormality is detected at a late stage, 
take place after 24 weeks. Rather the vast majority (91 per cent) occur 
between 10-13 weeks with a ‘continuing increase in the proportion of 
abortions that are performed under 10 weeks since 2002’ (Department of 
Health, May 2012, p. 9). As such there is no reason for thinking that a change 
in the gestational time limit would actually change existing practice; rather 
women’s behaviour in seeking professional help as early as possible is being 
met with a corresponding ability of clinicians to facilitate that. And clinical 
norms and the medical systems work hard towards ensuring that abortions 
can be provided at the very earliest point and making it earlier.  
 
41. While the analysis of Sheldon and Wilkinson highlights that some abortions 
performed under paragraph (d) may be shaped by social discrimination (for 
example the lack of support and services), they note that their own position is 
“that no woman should be forced to carry to term a disabled, or any other, 
foetus. In other words, termination should be legally justified by the mere fact 
that a woman does not wish to continue with a pregnancy.” Agreeing with the 
recommendation that Tom Shakespeare makes, notably that the same 
principles should apply to all abortions, regardless of any foetal disability, 
Sheldon and Wilkinson note that “such principles should be very liberal”  
(Sheldon & Wilkinson, 2001).  
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Retain paragraph (d) in its existing form 
 
42. There are some, who have raised the possibility that maintaining foetal 
abnormality as a separate ground might actually prove desirable ‘in order to 
allow for the tiny number of abortions carried out in the third trimester of 
pregnancy following the discovery of a grave fetal abnormality’ (Jackson, 
Medical Law , 2010, p. 682). We find that this is worthy of serious 
consideration. An analysis of the operation of paragraph (d) in practice as it 
relates to terminations performed after 24 weeks suggests that clinicians 
would appear to already factor in issues of ‘suffering’, ‘seriousness’ and take 
seriously the issue of ‘remediability’. This would seem to reveal that the vast 
majority of the (tiny number) of abortions performed under paragraph (d), and 
indeed, the minute number performed after 24 weeks, are performed on the 
basis of some kind of ‘seriousness’ criteria. It may be on analysis, that all are; 
in respect of conditions which some commentators note, such as Down 
Syndrome, are not incompatible with the living of a happy and fulfilled life, 
even this condition can be accompanied by a range of other problems. 
Individuals with Down syndrome are at higher risk of other conditions given 
that the consequences of additional genetic material are variable and can 
affect the functioning of any organ or bodily process, including blood defects 
including leukemia, and immune system problems. As such, it is not sufficient 
to assume that clinicians permitting women to terminate on the basis of Down 
syndrome are doing so in respect of discriminatory attitudes or assumptions 
about the worthwhileness of life. By way of an example, with a woman 
presenting at 35 years,  
 
[O]nly 57 per cent of Down syndrome foetues diagnosed at 13 
weeks gestation would result in a live birth (the others miscarry or 
are stillborn) (Morris & Alberman, 2009).  
 
43. Nevertheless, we would not recommend, for broader reasons that we highlight 
later in this opinion, that abortions under paragraph (d) are restricted to “grave 
foetal abnormality”, and that there is a need to factor in broader 
considerations into a matter which speaks to one of the most intimate 
episodes of our lives.  In particular in the next section we point to the equality 
of woman as a critically important issue for examination in any Inquiry which 
holds a concern with equality and the elimination of ‘discrimination’ at its 
heart. Insofar as it is possible that some abortions may be influenced by 
reference to the woman’s view of her ability to manage a child with a serious 
disability and of the environment which makes this harder to manage, we also 
raise questions as to the complex interplay of social discrimination with the 
lives of women who care for children with severe disabilities, and the impact 
that any revision to the Abortion Act 1967 would have upon these individuals.  
 
 
 
Continued…/(Part II: Women, Reproductivity and Equality) 
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PART II: WOMEN, REPRODUCTION AND EQUALITY  
Women and the Abortion Act 1967 
44. There is a risk that the question as to whether elements of the 1967 Act are 
discriminatory in respect of disability might overshadow a broader but very 
important issue: the equality of and respect for women. Anna Grear in a 
comment about the Jepson litigation noted that ‘it is likely that any reductive 
medicalization of the abortion question will result in an incipient denigration of 
the rights of both women and the unborn’ (Grear, 2004, p. 4). As we noted 
above, women are central to the Abortion Act 1967, and indeed to the 
evaluation of paragraph (d). Very serious equality considerations need to be 
taken into account before disturbing this.  
 
45. The Abortion Act 1967 emerged largely as a response to the horror of 
backstreet abortions but nevertheless constituted a major victory for the 
women’s rights movement who sought to secure access to safe and lawful 
contraception and termination. As the women’s liberation movement 
emphasised, gaining the freedom to decide whether or not to bear and nurture 
children is not merely important for women gaining control of their 
reproductive lives, but ultimately for gaining an identity untied to reproduction. 
Moreover, for women upon whom the burden of childrearing more often than 
not continues to fall, the decision of whether to become a mother or not is 
crucial to women’s personal well-being “definitive of her social persona, and 
predictive of her economic horizons” (Meyers, 2001, p. 735).  
 
46. Insofar as a foetus does not have legal personhood, a woman clearly does; a 
key principle of English law is respect for the autonomy of the patient. The 
Court of Appeal in St George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S; R v Collins and 
others, ex parte S [1998] 3 All ER 6736 determined that a pregnant woman 
cannot be forced to undergo unwanted medical treatment even if that would 
result in harm to her, or result in the death of a viable foetus. As the Court of 
Appeal commented, “In our judgment while pregnancy increases the personal 
responsibilities of a woman it does not diminish her entitlement to decide 
whether or not to undergo medical treatment. Although human, and protected 
by the law an unborn child is not a separate person from its mother. Its need 
for medical assistance does not prevail over her rights. She is entitled not to 
be forced to submit to an invasion of her body against her will, whether her 
own life or that of her unborn child depends on it. Her right is not reduced or 
diminished merely because her decision to exercise it may appear morally 
repugnant' (at 692).  
 
47. While the distinctive treatment of presumed normal and disabled foetuses 
may seem highly problematic, and in a juxtaposed way, deeply offend our 
sense of the value of all individuals in society, removing women’s ability to 
terminate in respect of disability is tantamount to compelling women to 
continue with a pregnancy and give birth to a disabled child that she will need 
to care for. This would appear to run against the grain of ideas of reproductive 
autonomy, and would appear to make women the martyrs of a political 
correctness model which has not been implemented in a society which 
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remains largely disabling and harder for women to exercise free choice over 
whether to continue with a pregnancy or not.  
 
48. Insofar as domestic Courts have resisted attempts by putative fathers to force 
a woman to continue a pregnancy (Paton v. B.P.A.S. [1979] Q.B. 276) by 
reference to the literal terms of the Abortion Act 1967, the (formerly termed) 
European Commission considered that the woman’s Article 8 Right to Private 
and Family life must prevail over that of the putative father’s. Although in a 
very different context, the pillar of consent is central to reproductive ideals in 
the context of the provision of assisted reproduction (it can be withdrawn at 
any point up to the point of implantation of embryos, see further Evans 
v.Amicus Healthcare Ltd and Others [2004] E.W.C.A. Civ. 727; Evans v UK 
(Application 6339/05, ECtHR Grand Chamber, decided 10 April 2007). 
 
49. Making women central to deliberations around the current structure of the law 
is critical. At present the Act permits termination for women who meet 
paragraph (a) up to 24 weeks irrespective of the condition of foetus, taking 
into account her social environment and circumstances. Some women in 
these circumstances may feel, for a range of valid reasons that they are not 
ready to take on the responsibilities of parenthood, whether by virtue of age, 
employment and financial circumstances, by virtue of health, or in respect of 
the particular relationship that that individual is in as well as the presence or 
absence of social support and family networks. In respect of the prospect of a 
child with a disability, where information surrounding the risk of foetal 
abnormality can occur very late, remarkably similar considerations apply. 
Though one can expect that many women do choose to proceed with a 
pregnancy even in the face of diagnosis of a serious foetal disability, not all 
women will feel capable or ready to take on the challenges entailed with such 
an outcome.  The prospect of caring for a child with a serious disability can 
have a serious financial impact, and impose very significant caring and 
emotional costs upon its carer in a way that leads to an impoverished life for 
the woman concerned, as well as the child she cares for.  
 
50. While in a more enabling environment women (and where applicable their 
partners) would feel better supported in caring for children with serious 
disabilities, as well as feeling content that society will support that child in later 
life, with better educational, social and employment prospects, so as to be 
better able to feel that continuation of pregnancy is a far more open choice, 
this is not the society in which we yet live. Research to date highlights 
extraordinary problems in respect of poverty, standard of housing, social 
deprivation and vulnerability to living with debt in respect of families with one 
disabled child, and very poor standards of living, and prospects for 
qualifications and employment by individuals with disabilities when compared 
to their non-disabled counterparts.7 In the context of even medical provision, 
and community care in respect of children with complex health needs, there is 
a strong realisation that it is far from all it could be; the shift from areas like 
paediatrics moving from a curative paradigm to an emphasis upon care of 
children with long term disability is a relatively recent one (Simkiss, 2011, p. 
193). As such there is much to do in achieving the delivery of an integrated 
service, with joined up working practices that provide for treatment, care and 
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support that matches a child’s needs, between the NHS and other agencies, 
which helps children and “their families live as ordinary lives as possible” 
(Simkiss, 2011). Yet such themes cut across every aspect of social life, 
illustrating a profound disparity between the lives of families with a disabled 
member, and those who do not. As Read et al note in respect of families 
supporting a disabled child,  
 
When all groups in the UK are taken together, the median 
equivalised income for a household with a disabled child is around 
13 % lower than those with non-disabled children. They are more 
vulnerable to living with debt, social deprivation and in poor housing. 
Consequently, in addition to the exclusion and discrimination 
associated with living with impairment, many disabled children are 
likely to live in circumstances that have been shown negatively to 
affect children’s development and educational achievement and to 
place them at risk of poor health and social exclusion (Read, 
Blackburn, & Spencer, 2012).  
 
51. As such, very serious attention needs to be paid to the strong correlation 
between families raising a child (or children) with disabilities, poverty and its 
perpetuation. It may well be the case that a great many of the limitations and 
barriers that carers and their disabled children experience are largely the 
product of a society which is structured so as to ignore their needs, however, 
forcing women through pregnancies in a way that will immerse them into a 
society that does not cater for their needs on the basis of ‘abortion’ colluding 
with social discrimination is quite another matter. Insofar as paragraph (d) of 
the Abortion Act resting in its existing form may be seen to collude with social 
discrimination, it remains the case that for individuals contemplating their 
reproductive futures and the prospects of having a child with a serious 
disability, the impact of a wide potential range of sources of social 
discrimination upon many aspects of their lives will be very real.  
 
52. The assumption that making changes to paragraph (d) of the Abortion Act 
1967 would result in a corresponding reduction in terminations on the grounds 
of foetal abnormality is to ignore a broader European and global context in 
which some individuals go to great lengths in order to facilitate their 
reproductive needs. In countries where access to abortion has been severely 
restricted, there is strong evidence pointing to a corresponding growth of 
clandestine terminations (see further discussion of the European Court of 
Human Rights in Tysiqc v. Poland Application no. 5410/03 [2007] 1 F.C.R. 
666) and of reproductive tourism (in respect of such reproductive tourism from 
states such as Ireland and Northern Ireland, see further IPPF European 
Network, May 2012, p.41; Fegan & Rebouche, 2003). As such, instances of 
restrictive regulation start to look like doorstep regulation. In Part IV of this 
document where we point to legal abortion regimes in other countries, there is 
a significant variation in the manner by which different jurisdictions regulate 
access to abortion on the grounds of foetal abnormality; a deeper analysis of 
the provision of abortion as it goes beyond the letter of law illustrates profound 
differences in practice.  
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53. There is a risk of stereotyping women that do access termination of 
pregnancy for foetal abnormality and presenting this as a typical or easy 
choice. The statistics on the numbers of abortions performed under Ground E 
every year, particularly in light of routine antenatal testing do not suggest that 
most women presented with negative information about foetal health do 
decide to terminate.. Some women do continue with pregnancies in the face 
of test results which point to a high risk of serious disability, and by no means 
do all women accept amniocentesis.  
 
54. In this latter respect, amniocentesis refusal can be shaped by a variety of 
reasons, from a personal objection to abortion to a willingness to accept a 
child irrespective of what conditions it may have. Indeed, it may be useful to 
explore through semi-structured interviews in the UK context, more stories of 
these kinds, as well as why women take up the option of amniocentesis when 
it is offered.8 Nevertheless, this information also needs to be taken into 
consideration alongside issues that we have raised above. Here we seek to 
highlight a concern with the practices which may influence termination on the 
grounds of foetal abnormality at any stage and for presenting women with a 
fuller choice, and indeed for shaping an environment which gives women a 
real choice.  
 
55. Even if one assumes that discriminatory attitudes help to shape the choices 
that individuals make, and that particular conditions ought not to form the 
subject of a termination of pregnancy, this is still not the whole story. There 
are objectively some conditions where it would not only be pointless but 
harmful for a woman to continue with a pregnancy owing to the presence of a 
fatal anomaly (such as anencephaly where the foetus may not have a head, 
some diaphragmatic abnormalities where the foetus will die or severe 
untreatable cardiac conditions). Insofar as continuing with a pregnancy in 
itself presents risks to the woman, with no prospect of a live child upon birth, 
on clinical grounds a termination of pregnancy would seem highly appropriate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continued…/(Part III: Abortion, Medical Practice and the Law)  
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PART III: ABORTION, MEDICAL PRACTICE AND THE LAW 
 
56. There are a number of legal issues at stake in respect of the clinical provision 
of services and treatment leading up to decisions to either terminate or not, 
under paragraph (d). The Inquiry will be presented with a great deal more 
practical information from clinicians that we hope will supplement and indeed 
refine what we say here. Our comment in this respect flags up the issues 
around the definition of paragraph (d) within law, the issue of informed 
consent and litigation against clinical professionals. It also turns to broader 
issues which may extend far beyond what law requires.  
 
Meaning of “Substantial Risk” and “Serious Handicap”  
57. There is no legal definition of either “substantial risk” or “serious handicap” in 
the 1967 Act. Wicks et al suggest that the legislation has been left 
‘deliberately vague’ in an effort to avoid fettering the discretion of the two 
certifying doctors’ (Wick, 2004). As McGuinness comments, the reluctance to 
consider explicitly the implications of section 1(1)(d) and to defer to the 
discretion of the medical profession, ‘is not surprising given the historically 
medicalised approach to abortion’ (McGuinness, 2013, p. 13).  
 
58. This issue of defining ‘serious disability’ was central to the case of Jepson v 
The Chief Constable of West Mercia Police Constabulary [2003] EWHC 3318 
(Admin),9 in which it was alleged that clinicians had performed an abortion on 
a woman at 28 weeks gestation because of a diagnosis of bilateral cleft 
palate. Jepson, who sought judicial review of the failure of the West Mercia 
Police to prosecute the doctors, claimed that this termination of pregnancy 
was not consistent with the terms of the 1967 Act. Her action failed to result in 
a prosecution, the Crown Prosecution Service having reopened the case and 
considered a wide range of evidence pertaining to the circumstances of the 
case.  
 
59. As the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists Working Party 
(Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 2010) have stated 
‘whether a risk will be a matter of substance may vary with the seriousness 
and consequences of the likely disability’. In respect of “serious handicap”, the 
RCOG Working Party notes, “nor is it clear whether the disability has to be 
present at birth or will quality if it is something that will afflict the child later in 
life”. As such the RCOG Working Party recommends that: “The Working Party 
sees little reason to change the current law regarding the definition of serious 
abnormality and concludes that it would be unrealistic to produce a definitive 
list of conditions that constitute serious handicap. An assessment of the 
seriousness of a fetal abnormality should be considered on a case-by-case 
appraisal, taking into account all available clinical information.” (Royal College 
of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 2010, p. 10). The Royal College of 
Obstetricians and Gynaecology has stated that a strict definition of “serious 
handicap” is ‘impractical by virtue of the absence of sufficiently advanced 
diagnostic techniques to detect malformations accurately all the time and it is 
not always possible to predict the ‘seriousness' of the outcome (in terms of the 
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long-term physical, intellectual or social disability on the child and the effects 
on the family).’ Instead, they recommend that its interpretation should be 
‘based upon individual discussion agreed between the parents and the 
mother's doctor.’10  
 
60. Later in this document we allude to different legal regimes in Europe that 
appear to endeavour to draw distinctions, sometimes providing a ‘tiered’ 
framework for addressing different potential outcomes in respect of the 
severity and impact of the disability. We do note, however, that a focus on 
foetal abnormality as the central issue for structuring termination of 
pregnancy, is tantamount to ignoring issues that we highlighted earlier in 
respect of equality concerns of women, the potential weaknesses of 
probabilistic data at different stages to detect very grave disabilities, how 
‘suffering’ is a social and not just a medical issue, as well as the broader 
concerns relating to social discrimination.  
 
Informed consent 
 
61. In the context of medical procedures, it is well established law that a clinician 
owes a duty of care to a patient to warn him or her in general terms of the 
possible serious risks involved in that procedure (Sidaway v Board of 
Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 
AC 871). The concept of informed consent in earlier law placed a significant 
emphasis upon the clinical view in determining what information/risks were 
detailed, much assisted by the way that negligence was determined, whether 
the practices of the defendant could be said to be in accordance with one 
body of medical opinion skilled in the particular field (Bolam v Friern Hospital 
Management Committee [1957] WLR 582). More recent cases have moved 
towards a more patient-centred perspective; in Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 
41, Lord Steyn noted that ‘in modern law medical paternalism no longer rules 
and a patient has a prima facie right to be informed by a surgeon of a small, 
but well established risk of serious injury as a result of surgery’. This shift is 
also discernible from the High Court determination of Birch v UCL Hospital 
NHS Foundation Trust [2008] EWHC 2237 (QB) where the patient had been 
warned that there was a 1 per cent risk of stroke associated with catheter 
angiography, but the patient was not informed that there was an alternative 
albeit slightly less exact diagnostic technique (an MRI scan) which carried no 
risk of stroke. Mrs Birth suffered a stroke and claimed that the doctor had 
breached his duty of care by failing to inform her of the comparative risks of 
angiography versus MRI. While the defendant’s expert witness claimed that 
the doctor’s duty consisted of merely informing the patient of the risks 
associated with the catheter angiogram (which he had indeed done) Cranston 
J agreed with Mrs Birth that this approach was not logically supportable.  
 
62. An analysis of practices in respect of the care of pregnant women and 
information provision up to the point of termination raises interesting questions 
in respect of informed consent; there are two issues which arise in respect of 
the provision of services around suspected foetal abnormality and the option 
of termination for foetal abnormality; the first is in relation to risk disclosure 
around the variety of tests which are provided as part of antenatal care, for 
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which many will not provide ‘certainties’, but rather more probabilistic 
‘information’, and the extent to which patients confronting that data 
understand the nature and purpose of those tests and their ramifications. The 
second concerns a more contextualised assessment of what choices are 
open to a woman/couple in such situations, both in respect of whether it is 
clear that such tests can be refused at any time, and that when confronted 
with data that suggests availability of termination, that alternatives are 
explored such as information around the implications of continuing with a 
pregnancy and the prospect of caring for a disabled child with the particular 
condition(s) highlighted.  
 
63. In respect of “understanding” risk disclosure in order to assist a patient in 
making a decision, the General Medical Council (General Medical Council, 
2008) provides guidance which highlights for doctors that they should bear in 
mind that some barriers to understanding may not be obvious, and as such, 
clinicians should make sure where practical, that arrangements are made to 
give patients any necessary support. In addition it advises that clinicians 
should use simple, clear and consistent language about risk given that 
patients may understand concepts of risk differently to clinicians. A broader 
sociological literature highlights this as a particular concern and the problems 
of creating a bridge between medical concepts of risk and the interpretation of 
medical data, and lay conceptions. Paul Atkinson’s (Atkinson & Parsons, 
1992) study, for example, which looks at the genetic hereditable condition 
Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy, found very fundamental differences between 
medical and lay understandings of statistical issues involved and suggested 
that these “discrepancies may have important consequences for the women’s 
reproductive behaviour”. Such work is amplified by an analysis of work 
exploring the communication of risk in the context of reproductive medicine 
(Karpin & Savell, 2012). Moreover, in the context of NP’s discussions with 
clinicians, she posed the question directly in terms of how individuals 
understand probabilistic risk, and she was told that “Some don’t understand 
what ‘high risk’ of Down Syndrome means” but that clinicians would take the 
time to explain.  
 
64. Nevertheless, what is clear, is that in the context of “understanding” existing 
law does not (and cannot) impose a detailed and high standard upon medical 
professionals that requires them to ‘force patients’ to understand. A relatively 
low level of understanding is needed to ensure the provision of valid consent 
so that no claim in battery would lie, in the sense that providing the patient 
agreed to a procedure which was in fact carried out, their consent will be 
effective and no action in battery will lie. As Bristow J held in Chatterson v 
Gerson [1981] QB 432 consent will be real as long as the patient had been 
informed in “broad terms” about the nature of the procedure. In the context of 
negligence, where the level of information then turns to the issue of more 
specific risk disclosure, and will require far more information so that a patient 
can make decisions about his or her body in determining whether to go ahead 
with a treatment or not, understanding would not seem to be the focus of the 
negligence tort. In Al Hamwi v Johnston [2005] EWHC 206 (QB) it was argued 
by the claimant that the clinician’s duty of care incorporated a duty to ensure 
that the information given to the patient had been understood. In this case, 
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while the patient had received standard information about the risks of 
amniocentesis, which include a one per cent risk of miscarriage, Mrs Al-
Hamwi claimed to have understood the risk to be about 75 per cent. Simon J 
held that to place the doctors under a duty to ensure that the patient has, in 
fact, understood the information would be to “place too onerous an obligation 
on the clinician”.  
 
65. The question of informed consent also raises other issues in respect of 
highlighting alternatives. In respect of decisions to terminate, authors such as 
Shakespeare for example have noted the desirability of providing individuals 
with information that balances the issue of termination; as he notes, “disability 
equality resources could be balancing the `medical tragedy’ information with 
more realistic accounts of living with a disabled child and, indeed, living as a 
disabled adult” (Shakespeare, 1998, p. 678). While we take this seriously as a 
live concern in the context of an ethical obligation for informed consent, it will 
likely go so much further than any legal standard. The emphasis in Birch upon 
the need for clinicians to counsel in respect of alternatives, goes further than 
previous authorities (and it is a High Court judgment with limited authority) but 
even if thought to form a desirable or compulsory aspect of medical practice, it 
would seem to be limited (and reasonably so) to medical practitioners 
exploring medical alternatives i.e. existing services and treatments which are 
routinely accepted within medical practice.  
 
66. In terms of whether clinicians are currently meeting a medico-legal standard 
of informed consent for women in the context of prenatal testing and abortion, 
it is not clear, at least on the basis of RCOG guidance, coupled with insights 
from obstetricians in the field, that clinical personnel are falling short of what is 
required by law. Nor is it clear that clinicians see themselves as actively 
promoting termination of pregnancy and ignoring the presence of clinical 
alternatives where these are present. As such, it seems likely that clinical 
practice in this area would seem to conform to the legal standard expected of 
them in respect of existing law, in promoting informed consent and 
counselling of options. It may be that a range of things conspire collectively to 
promote termination, however this needs analysis and extends beyond an 
analysis of abortion to the provision of reproductive services as a whole. The 
existence of tests for foetal abnormality, which is part and parcel of 
reproductive clinical practice, presents in itself a need to make sense of that 
information with individuals; in turn, other factors, like the existence of 
wrongful birth suits (essentially claims in negligence) help to confirm that 
offering tests, information, and indeed making clear the availability of abortion, 
are regarded as part of good medical practice which conforms with law. On 
the basis of NP’s informal discussions with two clinicians in Wales, and on 
preliminary view of the review undertaken by the RCOG Working Party (Royal 
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 2010) it would appear that there 
are clearly defined care pathways, which include a practice of speedy referral 
to other clinicians, such as paediatric cardiologists and other persons to 
discuss with patients the outlook for the foetus, and to discuss treatment 
options post-delivery, which speak directly to issues of remediability. These 
pathways and broader sources of information seem to form a critical part of 
what is needed for clinicians to discharge within a medico-legal paradigm their 
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duty towards achieving informed consent. Nevertheless, the Inquiry might 
form a view that prospective parents contemplating the issue of test results, or 
the prospect of continuing a pregnancy irrespective of a diagnosis of foetal 
abnormality, need broader support. There are questions as to who might be 
best positioned to provide this.  
 
67. In respect of this broader support, we consider here an ethical standard of 
informed consent that would very probably exceed the abilities and expertise 
of medical professionals, and indeed may not suitably be provided within a 
clinical context even if it would be useful for clinicians to endorse and 
recommend the approach (given patient deference to clinical/medical views). 
We are aware from our local discussions with Welsh clinicians, that there is a 
great emphasis on equipping clinicians with broader information which is 
germane to their patients, such as receiving lectures from people who look 
after children with various conditions such as Spina Bifida, or Down 
syndrome. Indeed talks by the Down Syndrome Society provide some insights 
from parents about how difficult/easy such children are to care for. As such, 
clinicians are being exposed to broader information and learning from 
people’s experience in a way that is clearly valuable. We would recommend 
that this kind of information transfer process becomes the norm if it is not 
already, insofar as this creates an enabling environment for prospective 
parents to feel comfortable with declining tests or indeed the option of 
termination when presented to them by clinical professionals.  
 
68. In respect of this broader support, which would appear to at least form an 
important part of clinicians discharging their responsibility to provide informed 
consent, we might hope for a greater emphasis upon broader information to 
be provided. In this respect, three issues loom hard for us.  
 
a. Firstly, the extent to which women and their partners understand the 
reasons that particular tests are offered to them, and that these tests 
are optional; as Karpin et al note (Karpin & Savell, 2012, p. 7), there is 
a strong concern that ‘prenatal testing is presented as something they 
have a responsibility to undergo’. They further note that, 
 
“although the literature provided to pregnant women about prenatal 
testing is at pains to present as genuine the choice confronting 
women about whether to (a) accept the offer of testing and (b) to 
have an abortion for an abnormality if identified (or in the case of 
PGD to select against disability), in fact it sometimes creates an 
environment in which pressure is placed on women to make 
particular decisions to reproduce “responsibly”” (Karpin & Savell, 
2012, p. 7).  
 
We believe that there is a compelling need for society to consider in far 
greater depth why precisely we do provide these tests, when we do and 
with what aspirations in mind; as Shakespeare notes “the very 
existence of a test for foetal abnormality can create pressures to use 
the technology” (Shakespeare, 1998, p. 675). In addition it would be 
useful to gain a stronger insight into why individuals do accept these 
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tests; it may be that individual women expect ‘reassurance’ which an 
understanding of the nature of these tests and the way that information 
is typically presented, might suggest is unlikely to be forthcoming for 
many with more sophisticated forms of testing provided later in 
pregnancy. As Karpin et al note, prospective parents may undertake 
testing in ignorance of its potential implications or because they expect 
the testing will provide reassurance. There may even be an expectation 
of a “perfect” pregnancy” (Karpin & Savell, 2012, pp. 13-14).   
 
“For most parents, the news that an abnormality has been identified 
in their unborn baby is completely unexpected. A problem of 
abnormality identified in the developing baby generally comes as a 
shock… In the light of the technologies available to monitor 
pregnancy, more and more abnormalities are also being identified 
through “routine” examinations such as ultrasound. Often the parents 
of babies identified in this way have never given consideration to the 
possibility that such a routine test would find something wrong with 
their unborn baby” (cited in Karpin & Savell, 2012, p. 13).  
 
Importantly, in terms of law, these subtle issues will be missed but 
themes of genuine choice in a deeper and critical sense are raised,  
 
“I don’t think the test for disability in the unborn child is presented as 
a choice, when I said I didn’t want tested the doctor was shocked 
and she tried to talk me into it because it’ s an easy test, everybody 
gets it done nowadays, it’ s simple. But I don’t think there is a choice, 
I think that we’re pressured into taking as many of these tests as are 
available” (cited in Shakespeare, Choices and Rights: Eugenics, 
genetics and disability equality, 1998, p. 675). 
 
Alongside this are a panoply of concerns, ranging from the 
‘rollercoaster’ journey which women are upon in the context of these 
obstetric procedures, to broader issues relating to how much trust is 
placed upon clinical professionals (Shakespeare, 1998, p. 675) in 
relation to decisions which essentially have far wide social import; it 
may be that here there is a mismatch between how clinicians view the 
information that they give (respecting that ideally prospective parents 
will search elsewhere for broader information) and how prospective 
parents centralise medical information.  
 
b. Second, and intersecting with the above, there is also need for some 
analysis around the understanding of risk in the context of information 
around the diagnosis of, and prognosis of a suspected disability. As we 
note above, there is a literature which illustrates the problems of 
gaining patient understanding of risks, for very understandable 
reasons. There is a rich psychological literature that suggests that 
depending on the way that information is framed, risks can be 
understood in very different ways with greater significance being 
placed on potentially a less likely but serious outcome (e.g. 75 per cent 
chance of survival versus 25 per cent risk of death).  
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c. Third, we think that it is important to focus on the provision of 
information which is given that helps prospective (or non-prospective) 
parents to contextualise (a) and (b) and to explore openly and without 
hindrance the option of continuation of pregnancy, as a genuine option. 
This would potentially include exploration of what it would be like to 
raise a child with a condition of the type that tests have illustrated might 
result; as well as information from existing parents of children about 
their experiences of testing and differential outcomes. We do not think 
that it would necessarily be appropriate for medical practitioners to take 
the lead (though certainly a supportive one) in facilitating this aspect of 
informed consent given that the medical encounter is a rather value-
laden one and indeed is time-limited with ever increasing pressure 
upon services. But importantly, it is also expertise-limited (to what 
extent does medical training involve insights into parenting children 
with disabilities?) so that one can doubt whether clinicians are well-
positioned to provide information of this nature. We highlight here 
resources which are at this stage experimental but designed to assist 
decision-making around amniocentesis in a way that goes beyond 
existing medical practice and what the law requires for informed 
consent: http://www.amniodex.com/).11 
 
69. A final issue, though still non-exhaustive, concerns other legal and practical 
pressures which ‘harden’ up the way that “good” medical practice is shaped 
and understood in respect of reproductive care. In addition, it also helps to 
redefine the way that abortion on the grounds of paragraph (d) is understood. 
As we would wish to note, obstetric and gynaecological practice is heavily 
encumbered by litigation, and in respect of the provision of antenatal services, 
from counselling, to testing to information provision, clinicians are susceptible 
to a range of negligence suits. In particular, suits known as wrongful 
conception and wrongful birth suits can be brought in respect of parenthood 
which is claimed to be unwanted. The latter, the wrongful birth suit is brought 
in respect (typically) of the birth of a seriously disabled child where it is 
claimed that but for negligence in the provision of counselling, diagnosis or 
information where there has been a failure to detect foetal abnormality, that 
the woman would have terminated her pregnancy under paragraph (d) of the 
Abortion Act 1967. Such claims can be, particularly in that they relate to the 
costs of raising a seriously disabled child (typically the costs of raising a 
‘normal child’ are deducted where the parents sought a healthy child) very 
significant in financial terms.  
 
 
 
 
 
Continued…/(Part IV: Human Rights and International Perspectives) 
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PART IV: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
70. As Gever notes in the European context, there is an absence of binding 
international standards on abortion; as such ‘it is up to the national legislator 
to make laws on the scope for and the limits to abortion' (Gevers, 2006).  
 
71. In the context of the European Court of Human Rights, this position has been 
confirmed in Vo v France (2005) EHHR 12 the ECtHR stating that the 
question of when a right to life accrued fell within the margin of appreciation of 
Signatory States. In the case of Tysiqc v. Poland Application no. 5410/03 
[2007] 1 F.C.R. 666, which concerned the applicant being denied access to a 
therapeutic abortion, the ECtHR demonstrated a preparedness to address 
questions relating to abortion only where these concerned procedural failures 
on the part of a Signatory State in facilitating services which are provided for 
by law. While the ECtHR found that Poland had failed to comply with their 
positive obligations to safeguard Ms. Tysiqc's right to effective respect for her 
private life under Article 8, this was in respect of failing to provide sufficient 
safeguards by which to properly determine access to termination of 
pregnancy on therapeutic grounds as determined by Polish Law. Poland has 
become the subject of extended analysis in respect of its seemingly 
haphazard abortion provision in P and S v Poland 57375/08 HEJUD [2012] 
ECHR 1853 (30 October 2012) where it was found that the Polish State had 
violated Article 8 in respect of the determination of lawful access to abortion. 
In this case a young teenager of fourteen years of age became pregnant after 
being raped was found to have faced pressures, harassment and 
obstructiveness from public hospitals, the police force and the Catholic 
Church in order not to terminate that pregnancy. The emphasis on the 
“determination” here is important given that the ECtHR noted that neither the 
Convention nor Article 8 determined a right to abortion as such (only that 
States provided access to abortion in accordance with their own laws). Note 
that the Tysiqc case does raise interesting questions about the transparency 
of the law in respect of provision of termination, as well as safeguards and 
appeal mechanisms (though in the context of that case, the absence of these 
had the effect of denying the applicant an abortion). Similar considerations 
attend the recent case of A, B and C v Ireland [2010] ECHR 2032.12    
 
72. The UK has recently become a signatory to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, which is binding on all EU law, and has a 
vertical effect. In particular we point to Articles 1 and 3;  
a. Article 1 states that “human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected 
and protected.”  
b. Article 3 refers to the “Right to integrity of the person”. Here Article 3 
which determines the importance of “free and informed consent of the 
person concerned” where this applies to the fields of medicine and 
biology, also notes in the same context “the prohibition of eugenic 
practices, in particular those aiming at the selection of persons”.  
 
It is not clear what ‘eugenic’ in this context means, nor indeed what “the 
selection of persons” means. This could mean existing persons, or potential 
persons. In the case of the former, which is the least problematic definition, 
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areas like euthanasia would be appropriate for analysis, as well as other 
practices which have been condemned as eugenic, such as compulsory 
sterilisation of individuals with intellectual disabilities. Such practices continue 
to be performed in specific cases although the English courts now take a far 
more cautious attitude in adjudging whether a sterilisation would be in the 
‘best interests’ of the individual in question (see the Court of Appeal’s 
management of SL (Adult Patient) (Medical Treatment) [2000] 2 FCR 452).  In 
the case of potential persons, however, this would not seem to be compatible 
with most Member States’ domestic law, including that of England and Wales 
where a foetus is not afforded legal personhood. As such, the foetus is not 
seen as a ‘person’ and rights which pertain to existing persons are not 
extendable to the foetus. Nevertheless, the emphasis upon the question of 
‘eugenics’ and ‘the selection of persons’ should compel us to analyse 
practices which do have these aspects in mind at the beginning and end of 
life. And as we have stated throughout this note there is a very strong 
correspondence, irrespective of the question of whether abortion is eugenic or 
discriminatory, between the kinds of practices which are widespread in 
reproductive medicine, and a society that continues to construct barriers to 
the attainment of equality between all existing persons.  
 
73. Insofar as there would appear to be nothing that compels a domestic revision 
of existing abortion legislation our focus is firmly upon the broader issues our 
study has revealed. An analysis of the extent to which society which on one 
hand purports to respect the inherent dignity of all persons yet on the other 
provides little in the way of support for existing women and for families with 
disabled children and for disabled people themselves presents a story of lack 
of human rights in respect of a very specific categories of individuals in 
society: existing women as the individuals that bear and care for existing 
children (whether disabled or not) and existing disabled people. Women also 
take the lion’s share of performing caring work for not only children, but for 
elderly parents who also may suffer from a range of conditions which prove 
limiting in a range of ways (Milne, Brigden, Palmer, & Konta, 2012). The 
extent to which abortion law might be felt to sit out of kilter with our purported 
equal respect for all human beings, and our value of all individuals, is a tiny 
part of a far more troubling picture. Here enormous questions can be posed 
as to the extent to which the UK is genuinely committed to promoting the 
human rights of disabled people and fostering networks and services which 
create not only an enabling and caring environment, but one filled with equal 
opportunities in the workplace and in broader social life. In this sense, the 
focus on abortion may be not only a distraction, but risks paying lip service to 
what is an incredibly serious issue. Indeed the connection between abortion 
and far broader trends, illustrates the extent to which disablism remains 
troublingly prevalent within society.  
 
European abortion regimes 
74. We briefly highlight here research undertaken from the International Planned 
Parenthood Federation European Network which provides a report detailing 
abortion legislation across Europe (IPPF European Network, May 2012). This 
provides an opportunity for gaining an insight into the manner by which 
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different legal regimes provide for abortion on the grounds of foetal 
abnormality. We do not attempt to summarise this, even with respect to the 
issue of foetal anomaly but rather we try to identify where it would seem to be 
the case that other jurisdictions manage paragraph (d) considerations in 
similar (but often with subtle differences) or very distinctive ways at least in 
the ‘letter of the law’. We felt that this could offer the panel a further route for 
exploring questions around the management of abortion on the grounds of 
foetal abnormality.  
 
75. We would offer three further cautionary notes: differential approaches on 
foetal abnormality does not tell us much in itself and would need to be read 
alongside the development of abortion law as a whole to understand it (e.g. in 
respect of countries where further safeguards are provided in respect of foetal 
abnormality, this can also be attended by a far more liberal regime in respect 
of abortions performed before 12 weeks); secondly, there will be broader 
cultural, technological, practical, moral and social conditions that shape 
differing approaches. So a fuller appreciation of these is needed, alongside an 
insight into how the system functions, to identify whether any revisions might 
be transferable in the UK context. Finally, as a number of recent ECtHR cases 
have illustrated, there can be a profound difference between what the law 
says, and what actually happens in practice. As such, a literal reading of the 
abortion regimes of different countries tells us remarkably little of the 
effectiveness and operation of abortion in those jurisdictions (e.g. Tysiqc v. 
Poland Application no. 5410/03 [2007] 1 F.C.R. 666).  
 
 
a. Akin to 67 Act where no time limit in respect of foetal abnormality: 
Examples –  
 
i. Albania - for an abortion on medical grounds (no limit) a health 
commission consisting of three physicians has to decide on the 
procedure after examination and consultation). Note that no limit 
in respect of a “Severe (incurable) malformation of the foetus”.   
ii. Belgium - no gestational limit in respect of a serious threat to the 
woman’s life or in the case of “Extremely serious and incurable 
disease’ of the foetus”. The opinion of a second doctor is 
required in both of these cases. The IPPF note that abortion 
legislation is interpreted liberally in practice (note that for 
abortions up to 12 weeks, these are permitted in cases where 
the pregnancy causes a ‘state of distress’ for the woman).   
iii. France – up to 12 weeks for ‘normal’ terminations, and no limit 
in cases of serious risk to life of woman, and in respect of foetal 
abnormality: “If a strong probability exists that the expected child 
will suffer from a particularly severe illness recognized as 
incurable”.    
iv. Germany – normal abortions permissible on request up to 12 
weeks following mandatory counselling, or where pregnancy the 
result of a sexual crime, no limit where this is intended:   
1. To avert danger to the life of woman  
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2. To avert the danger of a grave impairment of the physical 
or emotional state of health of the pregnant woman (This 
mental health risks for the woman include the ones 
caused by foetal malformation, and general health risks 
caused by adverse socio-economic conditions.)  
v. Kazakhstan: on request up to 12 weeks; social grounds operate 
from 12 weeks to 22 weeks; no time limit akin to 1967 Act in 
respect of danger to woman’s life or health, and “foetal 
malformation”.  There are concerns in terms of the 
implementation of abortion law and access to abortion in 
practice: Abortion is available all over the country but illegal 
abortions still exist and contribute to the maternal mortality ratio.  
 
b. Up to 22 weeks in respect of foetal abnormality:  
i. In Armenia, abortions are permitted up to 22 weeks in respect of 
indications relating to the foetus (e.g. Indications related to the 
foetus: intrauterine foetal death, congenital abnormality 
incompatible with life, repeated cases of infants born with 
congenital deformities/malformations or chromosomal diseases 
and sex-linked hereditary diseases in the family).  Note also that 
Armenia constitutes an interesting case in respect of 
reproductive norms - Ultrasound examination is not mandatory 
for the provision of early abortion, but is recommended in the 
following cases: previous history of, or suspected ectopic 
pregnancy; suspected significant abnormality of the uterus, 
tubes or ovaries; obesity that may preclude accurate clinical 
dating; suspected multiple or molar pregnancy.  Note also 
broader concerns, where IPPF reports that: Many women want 
to avoid legal abortion services and try to self-induce abortion at 
home using Cytotec (Misoprostol) based on a physician’s advice 
or the experience of other women. Cytotec is generally used to 
treat ulcers and can be purchased in pharmacies without 
prescription.  
 
c. Second trimester abortions permitted (between 13-27/8 weeks):  
i. Austria: Second trimester terminations are permitted in respect 
of grounds similar to those in the 1967 Act, including for serious 
foetal abnormality; however, there are concerns raised in 
relation to problems of accessing abortions generally in respect 
of conscientious objection. The IPPF note that after the 18th 
week it is virtually impossible to get an abortion in Austria, and 
that women travel to the Netherlands to get a late second 
trimester abortion.   
ii. Czech Republic: Abortions typically permitted up to 12 weeks on 
request; abortions are permitted after 12 weeks on grounds of 
serious foetal malformation or if the foetus is incapable of life. 
Terminations are permitted up to the beginning of the 24th week 
if there are genetic grounds for the abortion.   
iii. Denmark: the wording of Danish law is particularly interesting; 
abortions are permitted on request up to 12 weeks; in respect of 
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other contraindications, second trimester termination grounds 
are: 
1. Risk to life of woman  
2. Risk of ‘severe deterioration of woman’s physical or mental 
health’  
3. If pregnancy, childbirth or care of the child entails a risk of 
deterioration of the woman’s health on account of an existing 
or potential physical or mental illness or as a consequence 
of other conditions  
4. Danger that the child will be affected by a serious physical or 
mental disorder  
5. When the woman is incapable of giving proper care to a 
child due to a physical or a mental disability  
6. If the woman is for the time being incapable of giving proper 
care to a child on account of the woman’s youth or 
immaturity  
7. If it can be assumed that pregnancy, childbirth or care of a 
child constitutes a serious burden to the woman which 
cannot otherwise be averted  
8. When pregnancy resulted from a criminal act  
 
iv. In Sweden, while abortion is on request (permitted for any 
reason whatsoever) up to the 18th week; abortions cannot be 
refused up to the 18th week. After that point the woman needs 
permission from the National Board of Health and Welfare 
(Socialstyrelsen). Abortion is not generally permitted after the 
point of viability, which is generally treated as 22 weeks, except 
in extreme circumstances.    
v. Portugal; on request up to 10 weeks; up to 12 weeks to avoid 
irreversible damage to health of woman; up to 16 weeks in case 
of rape or other sexual crime; up to 24 weeks “if there are 
substantial grounds for believing that the foetus has serious or 
incurable malformations”; no time limit if abortion only way to 
avert risk of death to pregnant woman.  
vi. Tajikistan: up to 12 weeks on request; broad range of grounds 
for up to 22 weeks (including existing disabled member of 
family); no limit in case of serious risk to woman’s life or health. 
Note that where abortion regulations in England and Wales 
require that the opinion of two doctors are required in respect of 
determining whether a woman meets any of the grounds under 
the 1967 Act, in Tajikistan in the case of foetal malformation, 
assurance of three doctors (obstetricians/gynaecologists) is 
needed stating that the child if born may suffer from serious 
physical or mental defects.  
 
d. ‘Tiered’ regimes drawing distinctions between foetal 
abnormalities and other grounds in terms of ‘seriousness’:  
 
i. Finland has a fairly ‘staged’ or ‘tiered’ approach to termination; 
this provides a wide range of grounds for terminations up to 12 
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weeks (If continuation of the pregnancy or delivery would 
endanger the life or health of the woman on account of a 
disease, physical defect or weakness in the woman. If the 
delivery or taking care of the child would be a substantial 
burden. The burden can be of any kind. If a disease, mental 
disturbance or other comparable cause, affecting one or both 
parents, seriously limits their capacity to care for the child. Risk 
to mental health of woman The pregnancy is a result of rape or 
another sexual crime; If the woman is aged under 17 or above 
40; If the woman already had four children; Risk of 
malformation), up to 20 weeks (Risk to physical health of 
woman; If the woman is younger than 17; or any other reason 
accepted by the National Board of Medico-legal Affairs) and 
terminations up to 24 weeks in the cases where “a major foetal 
malformation has been detected using reliable methods). There 
is no time limit whatsoever in cases where there is a risk to the 
woman’s life.   
ii. Greece: up to 12 weeks on request; up to 19 weeks in respect of 
pregnancy being the result of sexual crime;  
1. up to 24 weeks in case “If signs of severe foetal 
abnormality induced abnormal infant birth”;  
2. No limit in respect of: “In case of demonstrated severe 
foetal dysfunction; If there is an inevitable risk to the life 
of the pregnant woman or a serious and lasting damage 
to physical or mental health, affirmed by the relevant 
doctor.”   
iii. Hungary: up to 12 weeks on request for a number of grounds 
including “If the risk of a major genetic problem of the foetus is 
higher than 10 per cent”, up to 18 weeks for other grounds; up to 
20 weeks “If the risk of a major genetic problem of the foetus is 
higher than 50 per cent and up to 24 weeks in case of delayed 
diagnostic procedure”;  No limit in cases where designed “To 
save the life or to protect the health of the woman from grave 
permanent injury; or if there is a substantial risk that the child will 
be seriously disabled or if the foetus is unable for extra-uterine 
life”.    
iv. See also Iceland which provides a staged access depending on 
seriousness of grounds (so foetal anomaly is one of many 
grounds for terminations up to 16 weeks), but terminations can 
be provided beyond 16 weeks in cases where life and health of 
woman endangered and where “the risk of malformation, 
hereditary defects or damage to the foetus is high”.  
v. Spain – up to 14 weeks on request; up to 22 weeks in respect of 
risk to woman’s life and health or in case of serious foetal 
abnormalities; after 22 weeks, “If foetal malformation is deemed 
incompatible with life or if the foetus is diagnosed with an 
extremely or incurable disease”.   
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e. No Gestational Limit specified in law in respect of any ground 
(common time limit):  
i. Cyprus: Not that there is a lack of data and research around the 
provision of abortion; the Cyprus Family Planning Association is 
considering recommending gestational limits, introduction of 
family planning services in hospitals, and a national survey on 
abortion.  
ii. Israel: no time limit in respect of any of the grounds under 
abortion law, of which “the child is likely to have a physical or 
mental defect” is one. Note that Israel requires that for all 
abortions sought for after 24 weeks (where foetal status 
changes) permission is required from the relevant Committee.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continued…/(Conclusions)   
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CONCLUSIONS  
 
76. At present, we would recommend no change in existing provisions of the 
Abortion Act 1967. While we note that the foetus does not have personhood, 
this is potentially one of the most mundane (though critical) conclusions that 
can be drawn in respect of the 1967 Act, in the sense that there are far 
greater considerations to take into account in arriving at the view that no 
revision of the 1967 Act should occur. That the law does not afford foetuses 
personality is a starting point for analysis, not its conclusion. As such, in 
analysing the question of social discrimination against disabled people, there 
are nevertheless many considerations beyond the status of the foetus that 
demand exploration. It is with this aspiration in mind that we have sought to 
provide a wide-ranging analysis of a multi-faceted problem to assist the 
Inquiry.  
 
77. We do not suggest that the distinction between presumed healthy and 
disabled foetuses is unproblematic. Rather the distinction as drawn in strict 
law appears invidious and does smack of discriminatory attitudes towards 
persons with disability in a way that we should strive to eliminate. This view is 
shared by many others in the field of medical law and ethics. Importantly, 
however, this does not point to any need (rather, all that we say above points 
to the opposite) to revise existing abortion law. An analysis of how abortion is 
provided in practice, suggests that the ‘discriminatory’ aspect of terminations 
performed under paragraph (d) may be largely rhetorical, and based on a 
strict reading of a piece of legislation which though sounding discriminatory in 
nature, operationalizes in contemporary practice in a very different way. The 
kinds of conditions for which termination of pregnancy is performed under 
paragraph (d) beyond 24 weeks (which is the “distinction” that sits at the heart 
of commentaries which claim paragraph (d) to be discriminatory) reveals that 
a tiny number of terminations take place at that point, and that these would 
seem to present examples of very grave conditions. As such, an assumption 
that paragraph (d) as it operates in practice is in fact discriminatory (rather 
than based on conditions which are in themselves impairments that are 
disabling per se) would seem to be largely a fiction. Nevertheless we do find 
that there are problems in the operation of the broader system which leads up 
to the decision to terminate, which itself may admit of ‘disablism’, and we 
focus heavily upon these as a means of identifying a more fruitful problem-
based approach.  
 
78. There are, of course, some who have made strong recommendations in 
respect of how paragraph (d) might be redefined or revised. Yet an analysis of 
literature from a range of fields illustrates a lack of genuine interdisciplinary 
effort in thinking through problem-based solutions even where it is possible to 
identify some areas of broad agreement by authors. There are also issues in 
respect of the comprehensiveness and expertise of authors who are bold 
enough to make normative recommendations as to how abortion law might 
change in respect of a finding that it is, at least in some respects, colluding 
with social discrimination. Some might suggest that a common time limit at 24 
weeks should be set; yet this is to ignore the medical reality that of the few 
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terminations performed after that point, grave serious disabilities can be 
diagnosed very close to that point, and after it. Others who have not 
recommended any change in the gestational period have, for example 
claimed that it would be important to make “suffering” (foetal) central to 
paragraph (d); insofar as we find that it seems likely that in practice suffering 
may constitute a key marker for medical professionals, to legally mandate this 
raises other serious issues. To legally mandate ‘suffering’ or ‘seriousness’ is 
to ignore other issues such as the ability of medical science to determine 
whether a particular condition meets this threshold, as well as the question for 
us, in terms of whether suffering or seriousness should be determined by 
reference to foetal health alone. In this respect, we have also pointed to 
broader factors relating to the real contexts and lives of those that live with 
severe disabilities, or indeed the lives of those that care for them. These 
issues tend to be missed where the focus is upon foetal condition in utero. If 
equality is the concern, there is often a suspicious absence of concern around 
women, and lack of analysis of the reality of caring for existing children with 
disabilities in literature, so that claims that ‘suffering’ or ‘seriousness’ of a 
foetus should be the guiding principle appear to be based upon romanticised 
assumptions about the reality of impairment and idealised images of an equal 
and enabling society which does not yet exist. A change in existing law, which 
restricts termination of pregnancy on grounds of disability, would be ignore to 
our peril, the equality and dignity of existing women, women who care for 
individuals with disabilities, and the lives of disabled people themselves. A 
wide range of factors, from a woman/family’s social and economic 
circumstances, their ability to cope, as well as the impact upon a woman’s life, 
employment circumstances, responsibilities towards other individuals, such as 
existing children or elderly parents need to be taken into account. None of 
these are trivial issues. Beyond this there is also a failure to account for how 
the distinction drawn between health and abnormality serve to underpin most 
of reproductive practice and shape many of our social institutions – 
sometimes in highly practical and important ways, and sometimes in invidious 
and clearly discriminatory ways. There is, in addressing the question of 
abortion on the grounds of foetal abnormality a need to unpack what is a 
highly complex series of questions and a problem which is polygenetic 
(stemming from multiple sources) in nature.  
 
79. The factors that we have highlighted here combined with the broader 
information that the Inquiry will be party to should strongly suggest that while 
promoting equality is critical, that any revision to the Abortion Act 1967 would 
result in a short-lived rhetorical victory for equality, and arguably 
counterproductive outcomes for society. Our view is that given the lack of 
state support and facilities for individuals with disabilities and for their carers 
alongside the very real impact upon women typically charged with the care of 
a disabled child, and indeed the prospects for that child itself, that decisions to 
terminate a disabled foetus in what is a disabling environment and society, do 
not look unreasonable. This is not to suppose that this does constitute the 
basis for termination decisions, but rather that if it were, this is less to do with 
abortion on the grounds of paragraph (d) being in itself discriminatory; rather it 
stands as a nasty symptom of a broader discriminatory structure and society 
which surrounds it.  
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80. There are, however, issues that we have flagged up that we feel need 
analysis. We would like more analysis of the kind of information that is 
presented to individuals, and the way that information is presented, so that 
women and their partners confronting the clinical issues at stake in prenatal 
care feel supported in making an open decision concerning their reproductive 
futures. In some cases this may present some with the opportunity to freely 
express that testing is not necessarily important (that this is their choice), to 
feel comfortable with refusing tests, and to feel that a decision to continue a 
pregnancy even where a known disability has been highlighted is reasonable. 
We also recommend that further enquiry be made of the provision of 
screening and specific tests such as amniocentesis, throughout every stage of 
a potentially wanted pregnancy, and to ask the question of why these tests 
are offered in the sense that the information would already seem to be shaped 
by unarticulated ideas about the intrinsic good of ‘information’. It would be 
worth analysing why particular women accept or refuse the opportunity to 
avail themselves of this information in specific cases. In addition further 
research on the attitudes of individual women and men to the prospect of 
having a child with varying levels of disability would be useful, alongside an 
analysis of how people understand probabilistic information about the risk of 
disability. As such, what we highlight here are the complex interactions which 
take place well before the question of abortion. In this sense, abortion practice 
in respect of paragraph (d) is interconnected with a wide range of practices 
and analysis of abortion in isolation is insufficient; in this sense, it opens up 
not only every area of reproductive practice for scrutiny, but raises far more 
reaching questions that cut across our society and relate to virtually every 
aspect of our social lives. 
 
81. Based on a broader picture of the existing treatment of those charged with the 
care of seriously disabled children, and the financial and hands on support 
offered to them, as well as the opportunities for people with disabilities in 
society, the overall picture is very gloomy indeed – illustrating a wide range of 
factors which coalesce to structure a disabling society. It is the presence of a 
disabling society which will make a decision to terminate a pregnancy for 
foetal abnormality a sadly not so unreasonable one for some individuals to 
make. An emphasis on a fuller operationalization of the spirit and aims of the 
Equality Act 2010 is demanded here. This means mobilising greater political 
and social support in respect of creating an enabling society in a way that 
makes the lives of existing disabled people (throughout the life course) and 
the people that care for disabled persons (where this care is needed) 
acceptable and normal. The Equality Act 2010 will need far more in the way of 
a political commitment to be placed behind it, for ultimately the focus upon 
existing persons with disabilities, and improving every aspect of society in the 
context of employment, social mobility, access to services and so on, seems 
to be the only genuine way of shaping an equal and enabling society. 
 
82. We are concerned that at a time when public services are being cut and 
where welfare benefits will be, in real terms relative to inflation, likely to 
reduce over time as a means of tackling the national deficit that those caring 
for individuals with disability or indeed disabled individuals themselves are 
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likely to be heavily and deleteriously impacted by these measures. Moreover, 
insofar as this presents a rather frightening picture, we are also concerned 
that the kind of effort required for creating the kind of enabling environment 
critical for allowing individuals a genuinely informed choice about continuing 
pregnancy, requires a very considerable investment on the part of society. To 
be clear, insofar as the emphasis here is upon structuring society in such a 
way as to facilitate freedom of choice and supporting decisions to continue 
pregnancy in a way that illustrates respect for all individuals in society, current 
governmental policy would seem to point in the opposite direction in creating 
ever greater obstacles and barriers for the very individuals it should support. 
In summary, the starting point for an analysis about discrimination should not 
be on the isolated issue of abortion, but upon a society that industriously pays 
lip service to the equality and dignity of existing individuals with disability. It is 
in this latter respect, that society must change.  
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NOTES 
                                                          
1
 See further, (Priaulx, 2007). 
2
 The case arose from an incident involving a French doctor who mistakenly ruptured a pregnant 
woman’s amniotic sac when he mistook her for another patient who was not pregnant. The Court 
considered that the issue of when the right to life begins was a question to be decided at national level: 
firstly, because the issue had not been decided within the majority of the States which had ratified the 
Convention, in particular in France, where the issue has been the subject of public debate; and, 
secondly, because there was no European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the 
beginning of life. Having regard to this, and the stance currently adopted in France, the European 
Court determined that “the issue of when the right to life begins was a question to be decided at 
45 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
national level: firstly, because the issue had not been decided within the majority of the States which 
had ratified the Convention, in particular in France, where the issue has been the subject of public 
debate; and, secondly, because there was no European consensus on the scientific and legal definition 
of the beginning of life.”  
3
 In the case of Paton v. B.P.A.S. [1979] Q.B. 276 where a putative father sought an injunction to 
restrain the defendants from terminating his estranged wife’s pregnancy, George Baker P stated,  
“The Abortion Act 1967 gives no right to a father to be consulted in respect of a termination of 
pregnancy. True it gives no right to the mother either, but obviously the mother is going to be right at 
the heart of the matter consulting with the doctors if they are to arrive at a decision in good faith. . .” 
Furthermore, we have made various references to the presence of ‘wrongful birth’ suits, which are 
brought in respect of alleged negligence in the provision of counselling and treatment resulting in the 
birth of a disabled child. These would, as one scholar has suggested, appear to have converted 
paragraph (d) into a ‘right’ on the part of women (Scott, 2005); certainly in its practical application, 
where women complain that “but for” the negligence they would have sought a termination under 
paragraph (d), seems to suggest that at least in most cases, an abortion would have been provided. To 
the authors’ knowledge, where this latter tenet is scrutinised it tends to be based on whether a woman 
would really have accessed a termination of pregnancy, rather than the practical issue of whether 
clinicians would have denied such an abortion.  
4
 Telephone interview with a consultant gynaecologist in South Wales, March 2013.  
5
 Insofar as 2 abortions were performed on other grounds. 
6
 S was a 28 year old veterinary nurse who, at 36 weeks of gestation, sought to register as a new 
patient with a GP. She was diagnosed with pre-eclampsia severe enough to require hospital admission 
and an induction of labour. S was advised as to the potentially life threatening risks to her and her 
baby. It was accepted that she understood the risks but she rejected the advice because she wished 
nature to take its course, without intervention. She was compulsorily detained for assessment under 
s.2 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (justified by reference to a previous diagnosis of moderate 
depression). An ex parte declaration that a non-consensual caesarean would be lawful was granted, a 
caesarean was performed and the baby safely delivered. At no point during her detention was S 
treated for any mental disorder. In the Court of Appeal, S was declared competent, and confirmed that 
it was the right of the individual to decide whether to accept or refuse treatment, and as such treating a 
patient in the face of their refusal constituted trespass. It also determined that it was well established 
principle that the foetus had no independent existence or legal recognition as a person.  
7
 See in particular information available at the Office for Disability Issues whose 2012 fact sheet 
(Office for Disability Issues, 2013) makes particularly depressing reading of which we allude here to 
only a part (the fact sheet as a whole highlights statistics  concerning living standards, employment, 
education, independent living, discrimination, leisure and social activities, transportation, 
communications, the justice system and housing).  As this fact sheet notes, while 16 per cent of 
children in families with no disabled member are in poverty, this percentage increases to 22 per cent 
in families with one disabled member. While the gap in non-decent accommodation has closed over 
recent years, one in three households with a disabled person still live in non-decent accommodation. 
One in five disabled people requiring adaptations to their home believe that their accommodation is 
not suitable.  Although improvements have been made in respect of disabled persons gaining 
employment over the last decade, it remains the case that disabled people remain far less likely to be 
in employment. In 2012, 46.3 per cent of disabled people are in employment compared to 76.2 per 
cent of non-disabled people. Disabled people are around twice as likely not to hold any qualifications 
compared to non-disabled. 20 per cent of working age disabled people do not hold any formal 
qualification (compared with 7 per cent of non-disabled equivalent); over a quarter of disabled people 
say that they do not frequently have choice and control over their daily lives; disabled people remain 
significantly less likely to engage in cultural, leisure and sporting activities than non-disabled people. 
In the context of access to the internet, in 2010, 58 per cent of disabled people lived in households 
with internet access, compared to 84 per cent of non-disabled people. Disabled people are 
significantly more likely to be victims of crime than non-disabled people.  
8
 An extremely interesting paper (Markens, Browner, & Mabel Preloran, 2010) based on research 
undertaken in California, United States explores through interviews why women accept or refuse 
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amniocentesis which highlights issues of what women in different situations read into the offer of 
particular tests (ranging from not wanting to disappoint physicians, feeling that it must be worthwhile 
because it has been recommended by clinicians to a woman who believed that the test was 
compulsory following a positive result on an earlier blood screen) which may be offered merely for 
the objective of knowing more, about avoiding shock at birth and allowing time to prepare for the 
resulting child.   
9
 In this case, Reverend Joanna Jepson successfully sought leave to apply for judicial review of the 
decision by the West Mercia Police not to prosecute clinicians who it was alleged conducted an 
abortion on a woman at 28 weeks gestation, because of a bilateral cleft palate. Jepson considered that 
this constituted an example of an abortion which fell short of the criterion of “serious handicap” under 
paragraph (d). The CPS reopened an investigation of this case (which the West Mercia Police had 
earlier determined there was no case to prosecute and that the doctors had made their decision in good 
faith meeting the standards of the 1967 Act) but concluded that following a review of the evidence of 
various kinds, it would not prosecute the doctors in question.   
10
 http://www.rcog.org.uk/what-we-do/campaigning-and-opinions/briefings-and-qas-/human-
fertilisation-and-embryology-bill/abort.   
11
 Professor Glyn Elwyn, who also leads Cardiff University’s Decision Laboratory research group, 
said: "With existing information and support provided to women who are offered an amniocentesis 
widely considered to be insufficient, amnioDex has been developed to facilitate decision making by 
providing decisional support and unbiased information. amnioDex has been carefully designed to 
offer women decisional support and unbiased information, and to assist them in a difficult decision 
made at a time of strong emotional upheaval. We are thrilled to receive these awards which recognise 
our commitment to developing and evaluating high-standard decision support interventions" (Cardiff 
University, 2009). 
12
 The essence of A, B and C v Ireland, is essentially the same as that found in the case of Poland.  
Finding that Ireland had violated Article 8 in respect of one of the applicants (C), the ECtHR stated: 
“…the authorities failed to comply with their positive obligation to secure to the third applicant 
effective respect for her private life by reason of the absence of any implementing legislative or 
regulatory regime providing an accessible and effective procedure by which C could have established 
whether she qualified for a lawful abortion in Ireland in accordance with Article 40.3.3° of the 
Constitution”. For a fuller analysis of this case see further Kalt (2010).  
